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BORDER DISPUTES: TRESPASS TO CHATTELS ON THE INTERNET
RicHARD WARNER*
The emergence of the vast informational ecosystem we call cyberspace
is an event of incalculable importance in the history of human liberty.
The diversity and vibrancy of this "never-ending worldwide conversation"
continues to astonish and amaze those who spend time there .... Having
brought this thing into being, how do we keep it alive and growing... ?
What's the plan?'
AVID Post's question is a good one. His answer calls, not for the plan,
but for "a multitude of plans from among which individuals can
choose," and he contends that "'the market,' and not action by the global
collective, is most likely to bring that plenitude to us."2 Post is arguing
against Lawrence Lessig, who contends that "[p] olitics and collective deci-
sionmaking, not the invisible hand, will give us a cyberspace where [funda-
mental democratic] values are protected." 3 Of course, neither Post nor
Lessig sees the market-versus-government choice as all-or-nothing. The
debate is about the appropriate proportion of each.4
* Associate Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I thank Harold Krent
and Christopher Leslie for comments on earlier drafts, and I owe thanks to
Graeme Dinwoodie, Christopher Leslie, Henry Perritt, Jr., Ron Staudt and
Margaret Stewart for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I presented a draft at a
Chicago-Kent Faculty Roundtable and I gratefully acknowledge the generous
assistance and encouragement of my colleagues. Finally, I thank the Marshal D.
Ewell fund for its financial support.
1. David G. Post, What Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1439 (2000).
2. Id. at 1440.
3. Id. This is Post's summary of Lessig's position, but it is accurate. See gener-
ally Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996) [herein-
after Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace] (discussing differences between regulating
communities in real space and regulating them in cyberspace); see also LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAwS OF CYBERSPACE 20 (1999) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE].
4. See, e.g., Post, supra note 1, at 1459 ("The truth, inevitably if somewhat anti-
climatically, lies somewhere between the rather more extreme positions to which
rhetoric often confines us. Just as Lessig recognizes the need for constraints on
collective power, the conscientious libertarian recognizes that there are times
when collective action is required to promote the common welfare ...."). Radin
and Wagner make the same point: "We ought to be talking about the details of
good mixtures, rather than debating top-down 'versus' bottom-up." MargaretJane
Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in
Cyberspace, 73 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1295, 1298 (1998). The terms "top-down" and
"bottom-up" refer to "Hayek's stylized distinction between bottom-up and top-
down ordering.... Cyberlibertarians identify Hayek's top-down central planning
(117)
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The debate could not sensibly be about anything else. At a minimum,
market participants have to know who is entitled to exchange what; an ex
ante distribution of entitlements is a prerequisite of market ordering. 5
Moreover, in any sufficiently complex society, laws-not non-legal norms-
play a critical role in defining entitlements. The ordering of commerce in
complex societies is always a mix of government regulation and market
forces. What is the right mix for e-commerce, and what are the legal
boundaries within which e-commerce should be free to operate?
These questions lie at the heart of the controversy over whether the
traditional doctrine of trespass to chattels should apply to the Internet. 6
The current focal point of the controversy is eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge,
Inc.,7 which employs the doctrine to assert a website owner's right to pro-
with state-backed law and his bottom-up private ordering with regimes of non-legal
customary norms." Id. at 1297.
5. See, e.g,Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management, "97 Micrti. L. REv. 462, 492 (1998) ("Market ordering and gov-
ernment oversight are complementary, not mutually exclusive, choices. Market
ordering presupposes some ex ante distribution of entitlements."); Mark A. Lem-
ley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CmI.-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1259 (1998)
(discussing need for initial distribution of entitlements). Lemley notes that "the
common goal of these quasi-private ordering advocates is to decentralize govern-
ance and return control to the people-at least, the people who write the con-
tracts." Id. Note that an "initial distribution of entitlements" is a bare minimum.
Complex market interactions require a good deal more. Government regulation is
an essential feature of the complex markets that typify the economy of virtually any
industrialized nation.
6. See generally Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559 (1996) (ap-
plying trespass to chattels to web for first time). In Bezenek, two teenagers commit-
ted trespass to chattels when they hacked into the equipment of a long-distance
telephone provider. See id. at 1563. The doctrine was applied again to unsolicited
e-mail. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020-23
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that sending unsolicited bulk e-mail constituted tres-
pass to chattels). Burk notes that "[t] he reasoning of CompuServe has since been
adopted wholesale without additional analysis in several suits by other Internet ser-
vice providers... " Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 27, 31 (1998).
7. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). eBay extends the application of
trespass to chattel beyond the sparn e-mail situations to cases of systematic search
of a website by "spiders," or software "robots," that automates the search process.
See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 n.2 ("Programs that recursively query other com-
puters over the Internet in order to obtain a significant amount of information are
referred to in the pleadings by various names, including software robots, robots,
spiders and web crawlers."); see also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp.
2d 238, 250-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (adopting eBay approach). The eBay ruling sparked
an immediate, sharply critical academic response in the form of an Amicus Brief
authored by twenty-eight law professors in support of Bidder's Edge's appeal of the
ruling. See Brief of Amici Curiae Reed Elsevier, Inc. et al. at .C n.13, eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C-99-21200).
Prior to the eBay ruling, Burk launched a sustained attack on the idea of applying
trespass to chattels to websites. See generally Burk, supra note 6, at 53-54 (arguing
for new theory of digital nuisance as mechanism for balancing competing inter-
ests). The main targets of Burk's attack were the courts' rulings in Bezenek and
CompuServe. See id. at 28-31 (discussing each court's application of trespass to chat-
[Vol. 47: p. 117
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hibit access to the website.8 The ruling protects a business' interest in
controlling access to its premises.9 The protection provided, however, is
potentially so broad that it threatens another critical interest: the interest
of all Internet users in low-cost, worldwide communication and unim-
peded access to information. Low-cost communication and open access to
information have been, and continue to be, critical to the rapid growth
and vitality of both the Internet and e-commerce.10 This Article examines
how to balance these competing interests and demonstrates that trespass
to chattels provides an appropriate doctrinal setting in which to engage in
such balancing.
tels); see also Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 121, 121
(1999) (proposing that "self-help" is promoted by unclear rules governing
entitlements).
8. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-72 (indicating that electronic signals sent
by Bidder's Edge to retrieve information from eBay's computer system are suffi-
ciently tangible to support trespass cause of action).
9. See id. at 1073 (enjoining preliminarily Bidder's Edge from accessing eBay's
computer systems by use of any automated querying program without eBay's writ-
ten authorization).
10. See infra Section I.C. Many have noted the key role of low-cost communi-
cation and open access to information to the development of the Internet. See,
e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Economic and Other Barriers to Electronic Commerce, 21 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 563, 564 (2000) ("Consumers can shop worldwide for little more
than one thousand dollars for a personal computer and ten to twenty dollars per
month for Internet service."); Patricia Buckley, The Emerging Digital Economy II: Elec-
tronic Commerce in the Digital Economy ("Both the new Internet-based companies and
the traditional producers of goods and services are transforming their business
processes into e-commerce processes in an effort to lower costs, improve customer
service, and increase productivity."), at http://www.ecommerce.gov/ede/chap-
terl.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2001); Paul Taylor, Reaping the Rewards of IT Growth:
The Digital Revolution Is Bringing About Huge Worldwide Economic and Social Changes,
Which Will Enhance Job Creation and Transformation and Change the Way in Which Busi-
ness Is Conducted, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sept. 1, 1999, at 1 ("It is revolu-
tioni[z]ing our access to information and the way we communicate ...."). All of
these articles emphasize the remarkably rapid growth of the Internet. See, e.g.,
Taylor, supra, at 1 ("The pace of change has accelerated markedly since the mid-
1990s when the Internet began to be exploited commercially, emerging as the
driving force for a new economic revolution."). The low cost of communication of
and access to information is the reason for this rapid growth. See Sherman
Fridman, Internet Fuels Record American Economic Growth, NEwsBYrEs ("For example:
it now costs an airline issuing an electronic ticket about a tenth the amount when
travel agents were involved in the process."), Mar. 27, 2000, at http://www.info-sec.
com/commerce/00/commerce_032700aj.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2001). Ef-
fross makes a similar point:
A major "selling point" of the World Wide Web is its ability to offer a
"virtual storefront" to anyone, from an individual to a multinational cor-
poration, with a product to market. Commercially available software
packages enable even those computer users who are not versed in the
intricacies of programming to create customized Websites quickly and at
a relatively low cost.
Walter A. Effross, The Legal Architecture of Virtual Stores: World Wide Websites and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1263, 1266-68 (1997).
2002]
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One may wonder about the wisdom of employing trespass to chattels
in the Internet context. E-commerce and the Internet are late twentieth
and early twenty-first century phenomena. The legal doctrine of trespass
to chattels evolved in a much older and very different economic and tech-
nological setting.' ' Applying the doctrine to the Internet carries the dan-
ger that courts will invoke a traditional, and possibly inappropriate,
property right in ways that interfere with the Internet's life-blood-low-
cost communication and unimpeded access to information. Hence the
question: Should an owner of a website be allowed to invoke trespass to
chattels to prevent access to the website? Does this property law doctrine
adequately frame the problem so that the interests of businesses and users
can be balanced?
This Article argues that it does-provided that an adequate under-
standing of the contemporary technological and economic context guides
the doctrine's application. The argument turns in part on a standard
point in law and economics: that granting a business the right to exclude
others facilitates the negotiation of license agreements that transfer access
rights to the party that values them most highly.1 2 Section I examines a
brick-and-mortar business' right to exclude others from its premises and
argues that we should use trespass to chattels to extend almost the same
right to web businesses. 3 Sections II, III and IV distinguish three types of
relationships that may hold between web businesses and argue, in each
case, for a particular balancing of a business' interest in controlling access
against the general interest in low-cost communication and unimpeded
access to information. 14 The interest balancing identifies when we should
and should not grant a website a right to exclude others. The key here is
identifying when granting the right will promote desirable license agree-
ments and when it will not. Section II begins the task of distinguishing the
three relationships by analyzing the relationship between eBay and Bid-
der's Edge. 15 The section concludes with a definition of the first type of
relationship.1 6 Against this background, Sections III and IV define the
two remaining relationships. 17 Sections V and VI argue that we can use
trespass to chattels as the doctrinal framework in which we can legally im-
plement the balancing of interests delineated in Sections II, III and IV.' 8
11. See generally STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS
§ 23.23 (1990) (discussing origin of trespass to chattels doctrine).
12. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972)
(applying approach which integrates economics with legal subject areas such as
Property and Torts); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(discussing actions of business firms having harmful effects on others).
13. See infra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 39-107 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 80-107 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 107-50 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47: p. 117
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I. CONTROLLING ACCESS: BRIcK-AND-MORTAR VERSUS THE INTERNET
The ultimate conclusion of this Article is that trespass to chattels
should be used to give web businesses almost the same right to control
access to its place of business that a brick-and-mortar business enjoys. The
"almost" is important. The special nature of the Internet context justifies
crucial limitations. The right that a brick-and-mortar business has to con-
trol access to its premises is considered first.
A. Brick-and-Mortar Control Over Access
The doctrines of trespass to land and trespass to chattels provide a
brick-and-mortar business with a broad right to control access to its real
and personal property.' 9 Constitutional limitations and antitrust laws con-
strain this right in a variety of ways. 2 0 The constitutional concerns center
around discrimination and the rights of free speech and free association.
The paramount importance of individual freedom motivates and explains
the constitutional concerns, and the importance of individual freedom
also provides a powerful rationale for conferring a fight to exclude. Indi-
viduals not only have the moral right to speak and to associate with whom
they please, they also have (within limits) the moral right not to speak and
to avoid association. 2 1 This concern with individual freedom lies at the
very heart of democratic political organization and provides a powerful
reason to give a web business the same control over access that a brick-and-
mortar business enjoys. In a liberal democracy, citizens have, within con-
stitutional limits, a broad right-even in business-to determine with
whom they associate and speak.
There is also an economic reason for recognizing a right to exclude.
A commitment to a free market economy is a commitment to letting mar-
ket participants decide what, when and with whom they buy and sell.
19. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In
Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J 561, 565 (2001) (citing
Culhane v. State, 668 S.W.2d 24 (Ark. 1984)) ("In the conventional retail context,
the real property right to exclude includes the right to ban those who would
gather comparison-shopping data from entering a retail establishment, and to re-
move them from the premises once the owner detects their activity."). In Culhane
v. State, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the criminal trespass statute was
the correct statute to use in the context of comparison shopping. See 668 S.W.2d
24, 25-27 (Ark. 1984) (holding that specific criminal trespass statute involved is
constitutional); see also Mosher v. Cook United, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 720, 720-22 (Ohio
1980) (applying criminal trespass statute to comparison shoppers).
20. See O'Rourke, supra note 19, at 604-09 (discussing possible antitrust viola-
tions by eBay). The Department ofJustice's antitrust division began a preliminary
investigation of eBay around February 2000. See Carolyn Koo, Justice Department
Investigating eBay (Feb. 4, 2000) (noting that Justice Department spokesman con-
firmed investigation), at http://www.thestreet.com/_yahoo/brknews/internet/
877181.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2001).
21. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("The right to speak and
the fight to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader
concept of 'individual freedom of mind'.").
2002]
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Other things being equal, letting market participants decide these ques-
tions is more efficient than taking the decision out of their hands.2 2 Prop-
erty rights play an essential role in placing market decisions in the hands
of market participants. Not only do they define who is entitled to ex-
change what, they also enable sellers to control with whom they share busi-
ness resources and to whom they will sell-as well as where, when and how
they do so.
The political and economic considerations argue strongly for ex-
tending to a web business-with crucial qualifications-the same right to
exclude that a brick-and-mortar business enjoys. The logical way to
achieve this is through the doctrine of trespass to chattels. Access to a
place of business on the Internet, such as a commercial website, is medi-
ated by electronic access to a piece of personal property: the server on
which the website resides. To recognize a right to control access to the
server is to recognize a right to control access to the website.23
22. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 50
(1975) (summarizing efficiency claims). In this classic, Okun states:
The case for the efficiency of capitalism rests on the theory of the "invisi-
ble hand," which Adam Smith first set forth two centuries ago. Through
the market, greed is harnessed to serve social purposes in an impersonal
and seemingly automatic way. A competitive market transmits signals to
producers that reflect the values of consumers. If the manufacture and
distribution of a new product is profitable, the benefits it provides to buy-
ers necessarily exceed the costs of production. And these costs in turn
measure the value of the other outputs that are sacrificed by using labor
and capital to make the new product. Thus, profitability channels re-
sources into more productive uses and pulls them away from less produc-
tive ones. The producer has the incentive to make what consumers want
and to make it in the least costly way. Nobody is asked to evaluate what is
good for the system or for the society; if he merely pursues his own eco-
nomic self-interest, he will automatically serve the social welfare.
Id.
23. I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Websites, 1996J. ONLINE
L. art. 7, 2-57 (arguing for application of trespass to land to websites), at http:/
/www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/95_96/hardy.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2001);
see also Susan M. Ballentine, Note, Computer Network Trespasses: Solving New Problems
with Old Solutions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209, 216 n.47 (2000) (explaining impor-
tance of operation of server's computer system). Hardy's approach requires re-
garding a website as property on which one can trespass in the way one can
trespass on land. See Hardy, supra, 1 19-52 (summarizing four key theories).
O'Rourke also sees the issue of trespass on the Internet as turning partly on
whether we regard websites as analogous to land. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fenc-
ing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 640 (1998)
("If a website is considered property, the question arises as to the scope of the
owner's right to exclude others from accessing it by linking."). Hardy adds that
the "notion that a cause of action for 'trespass to web sites' should exist as a means
of enforcing control over access to web sites may seem strange. But many things
about the Web are strange." Hardy, supra, 53. Strange or not, application of the
doctrine of trespass to land is not necessary once we realize that access to the
website is mediated by access to the server. The server is a paradigmatic, tradi-
tional example of a chattel, an item of personal property.
[Vol. 47: p. 117
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss1/4
2002] TRESPASS TO CHATTELS ON THE INTERNET
To recognize this right is not, however, to recognize an unqualified
right to exclude others from the website. To the contrary, recognizing a
right to control access provides a framework for balancing business and
user interests. Such balancing is typical of property rights:
All property rights systems teeter between the protection of two
sometimes conflicting interests: the right of the property right
holder to exclude others, and the right of third parties to access
the property .... [P]roperty right systems often place limitations
on the right to exclude when the right to access is more
important. 24
In the Internet context, limitations on a website owner's right to exclude
are appropriate when the right to access the website is more important.
Key features of the Internet, features to which this Article refers when ar-
guing that a right of access should prevail over a right to exclude, are
considered next.
B. A Brief Sketch of the Internet
The Internet is a dynamic network that is rapidly increasing in extent
and complexity. Low-cost access to the Internet fuels its rapid expansion.
A modest fee allows one to communicate by e-mail, search the Internet
and create and maintain a website.2 5 The Internet-or, more properly,
the World Wide Web 26-is an array of millions of individual websites offer-
24. Shubha Ghosh, The Morphing of Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Intellec-
tual Property Optimist Examines Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 99, 104 (1997). Burk emphasizes the same point:
The structure of entitlements in real property is not, and never has been,
characterized by packets of complete and well-defined rights; real prop-
erty entails not simply a clear right to exclude, as in the case of trespass, but
a host of less determinate rights under the law of easements, takings, nui-
sance, possessory interests, adverse possession, and the like.
Burk, supra note 7, at 126 (1999) (emphasis added). Burk may be right about
traditional applications of trespass to chattels, but this Article argues for an exten-
sion of that doctrine that balances competing concerns.
25. See Perritt, supra note 10, at 564 (stating that declining prices for basic
components of networked computing has lowered economic barriers to entry for
merchants and consumers). Nevertheless, creating and maintaining a commercial
website can involve considerable expense. For example, WebHouse Club (a price-
line.com initiative) spent $360 million dollars, at a rate of $1 million per day, in a
failing attempt to sell consumer goods online at deep discounts. See Steve Mott,
Tfial By Fire, BusINESs 2.0, Dec. 26, 2000, at 78, 78 (stating that WebHouse Club was
wild, impulsive $360 million experiment). A properly designed and managed web
business, however, offers advantages that more than justify the investment. See gen-
erally PHILIP EVANS & THOMAS S. WURSTER, BLOWN To Brrs: How THE ECONOMICS
OF INFORMATION TRANSFORMS STRATEGY (2000) (offering strategic perspective on
how to apply new economics to old businesses).
26. We need not distinguish between the World Wide Web and the Internet,
although they are different. The World Wide Web is the graphical, multimedia
part of the Internet. See Encyclopedia Britannica, World Wide Web (WWW) (defining
World Wide Web as leading information retrieval service of the Internet), at http:/
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ing information, communication and interaction. It caters to virtually
every interest, from the profound to the trivial, the laudable to the repre-
hensible. Links tie these millions of sites together in a complex web. 27 A
link functions like a messenger service delivering information to one's
computer on demand:
[W]hen a user clicks on a link, the user's computer sends a re-
quest to the server on which the desired document resides. That
computer decides whether or not to respond favorably to the
query. It honors the request by sending a copy of the document
to the user's computer, while the original remains on its server.
In other words, the user who clicks on a link starts a chain of
events that uses resources of both his or her own system and
those of the linked system. 28
Linking is an excellent example of the benefits of low-cost communica-
tion. Links proliferate in part because creating a link is easy and has negli-
gible cost-all one needs is the linked-to website's address.2 1 Ever-
increasing numbers of links weave an ever-more complex web of millions
upon millions of links.
The Internet is "alive" with automated search programs executing a
continuous sweep and indexing its results on specialized search engine
websites in vast, searchable databases of links. Search engines thrive on
unimpeded access to information. This search-engine-indexing function
is:
critical to the effective use of the Internet. The Internet has mul-
tiple sources of information at the back end (hundreds of mil-
lions of Web pages), but only one means of accessing that
/www. britannica. com/ eb/ article? eu = 2517 & tocid = 0 & query = world%20wide%
20web (last visited Nov. 3, 2001). The Internet includes non-web functions such as
e-mail and the file transfer protocol. See Encyclopedia Britannica, Internet (defin-
ing Internet as network connecting many computer networks based on a common
addressing system and communications protocol), at http://www.britannica.com/
eb/article?eu=1460&tocid=0&query=internet (last visited Sept. 3, 2001).
27. See O'Rourke, supra note 23, at 630-34 (describing linking of web). Link-
ing is the essence of the Web. See id. at 615-19 (noting that World Wide Web's
basic function is to link information together). O'Rourke, also notes that:
[t]he web uses software that allows one document to link to and access
another, and so on, despite the fact that the documents may reside on
different machines in physically remote locations. The dispersion of data
that is the Internet is thus largely overcome by the web's ability to link
related information in a manner transparent to the user. This has helped
to make the Internet into a medium of mass communication and a vast
commercial market place.
Id. at 611.
28. O'Rourke, supra note 19, at 569.
29. See, e.g., Microsoft Office, Microsoft FrontPage (advertising that Microsoft's
FrontPage program makes creating link matter of only few minutes work), at
http://www.microsoft.com/frontpage (last visited Sept. 3, 2001).
[Vol. 47: p. 117
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information at the front end (the consumer's computer screen).
Further, the Internet is a medium where information transmis-
sion is predominantly of the 'pull' type: servers on the Internet
are passive and do not deliver information to a consumer's com-
puter unless that information is requested. Unless consumers
have reliable means to search through the immense number of
passive servers quickly, easily and independently, many consum-
ers will not be able to find the information that would be most
useful to them. To provide impartial, accurate and timely infor-
mation, search engines, shop bots, and other data tools must ac-
cess and centralize information that already exists on other web
servers, but which is too distributed to be of practical use to the
consumer who may not be sophisticated enough to locate all of
the information herself.30
The linked, search-engine-indexed Internet has changed and continues to
change communication, culture and commerce. 3 1 The important role of
linking and searching will be a critical factor in the analyses that follow.
Commercial websites are places of business on the Internet. Determining
when such a business should have the right to exclude others from its
website is discussed next.
C. The Broader Boundary Issue
Whether to grant a right to exclude from a website is a special-but
central and important-case of the more general issue of where and how
to draw boundaries in cyberspace. An adequate answer is necessary for the
Internet to continue to evolve. As Lawrence Lessig states:
The present architecture of cyberspace is changing. If there is
one animating idea behind the kinds of reforms pursued both in
the social and economic spheres in cyberspace, it is the idea to
increase the sophistication of the architecture in cyberspace, to
facilitate boundaries .... It is the movement to bring zoning to
cyberspace. 32
As the Internet evolves, boundary-drawing issues will become ever
more critical. Consider Bill Gates' vision of the future of the Internet.
30. Brief of Amici Curiae Reed Elsevier, Inc. et al. at I.B n.7, eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C-99-21200).
31. See generally BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD (1995) (discussing impact of
Internet).
32. Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, supra note 3, at 1408-09. Although Lessig
emphasizes the role of technological boundaries, he acknowledges the role of legal
prohibitions as well. See id. at 1407-08 (discussing how community regulates itself
by internalizing norms that state sets).
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Gates envisions an Internet that has transformed itself "into more than a
medium that simply presents static information."3 3 He predicts that:
[i]nstead of being made up of isolated islands where the user
often provides the only integration, [the next generation In-
ternet] must enable constellations of computers, intelligent de-
vices and web-based services to collaborate seamlessly .... At the
core of this transformation is Extensible Markup Language, or
XML .... The effect of this technological lingua franca.., will be
far-reaching. XML "unlocks" data so that it can be organized,
programmed, edited, and exchanged with other sites, applica-
tions, and devices. In effect, it turns every web page into a
programmable mini-data-base .... XML enables different web-
sites to share all kinds of data without having to use the same
computer language or software application. Individual websites
can collaborate to provide a variety of web-based services that can
interact intelligently with each other. And information can more
easily move from one device to another.3 4
Gates also emphasizes that, on an Internet where information can be so
easily shared, control over access will be critical. The future Internet
"must offer individuals complete control over how and when and what
information is delivered to them, and allow them to protect their privacy
and security by controlling who has access to their personal
information. 3 5
There is no easy answer to how to achieve such control. Dan Burk
notes that "[d]igital communications media challenge our established no-
tions of boundary. In the relatively short time since the Internet exploded
into public consciousness, no aspect of this medium has so captured the
attention of courts and commentators as its capacity to erode barriers."36
Burk is not thinking merely of political barriers. He emphasizes that as "it
[has] challenged other notions of boundary, the Internet similarly chal-
lenges the boundaries demarcating rights in property."3 7 The eBay court's
application of trespass to chattels to websites poses this challenge in the
sharpest way. eBay wants to control access to its website by competitor
auction sites that systematically search its website to extract information
from it.38 Was the eBay court correct when it asserted that eBay has a legal
right to exclude others from its site?
33. Bill Gates, Now for an Intelligent Internet, THE ECONOMIST: TuE WORLD IN
2001 121, 121 (2000).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Burk, supra note 7, at 121-22.
37. Id. at 122.
38. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1073 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (holding that competitor auction site could not access eBay's computer sys-
tems by use of any automated querying program without eBay's written permis-
sion). The information in question is purely factual (about products and prices)
[Vol. 47: p. 117
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II. THE E-COMMERCE CONTEXT
An adequate evaluation of the eBay ruling requires an understanding
of the e-commerce context of the eBay/Bidder's Edge dispute.39 Having
such an understanding avoids a danger identified by Shubha Ghosh.
Ghosh finds "a presumption in the literature that real property models
apply to [c]yberspace .... 40 He complains that "this presumption ig-
nores the varied sets of relationships that exist in [c]yberspace."41 Ghosh
also complains that the presumption "ignores that information differs
from [physical property], both in use and in value." 42 Far from ignoring
the "varied relationships," this Article lays down legal boundaries that
track the varied e-commerce relationships. The eBay/Bidder's Edge dis-
pute illustrates the first of three relationships on which this Article focuses.
A sketch of the factual background of that dispute is provided next.
A. Factual Background
eBay is an auction website on which sellers list items for sale, and
prospective buyers post bids and track the status of auctions. 43 eBay is by
far the largest of hundreds of similar sites. 44 The large number of auction
sites creates a dilemma for buyers: should a buyer search only one, or just
a few, websites and settle for the best combination of price and quality the
limited search reveals? Or, is a broader search worth the extra effort?
Bidder's Edge solves this dilemma. Bidder's Edge allows a buyer to
perform a single search on its website that yields a list of all relevant items
for sale on over one hundred other auction websites. 45 The list includes
prices and product descriptions, and each item in the list is linked to the
and, in the United States, factual information compiled in a database is not pro-
tected by copyright. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99-CV-7654,
2000 WL 1887522, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) ("The primary star in the copy-
right sky for this case is that purely factual information may not be copyrighted.").
39. See O'Rourke, supra note 19, at 566 ( emphasizing that "the law needs a
framework informed by competitive concerns to help define property rights on the
Internet appropriately").
40. Shubha Ghosh, Gray Markets in Cyberspace, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 19
(1999).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 20.
43. See eBay, Company Overview (describing business of eBay), at http://
pages.ebay.com/community/aboutebay/overview/index.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2001).
44. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060-62 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (discussing how eBay is giant among this multitude). The eBay court
notes that "eBay currently has over 7 million registered users. Over 400,000 new
items are added to the site every day. Every minute, 600 bids are placed on almost
3 million items. Users currently perform, on average, 10 million searches per day
on eBay's database. Bidding for and sales of items are continuously ongoing in
millions of separate auctions." Id. at 1060 (citations omitted).
45. See id. at 1061-62 (describing function of Bidder's Edge). More accu-
rately, it used to solve the dilemma. See Steven Bonisteel, ebay-Battling Bidder's Edge
Folds Auction-Search Business (stating that Bidder's Edge shut down its website on
2002]
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web page offering that item for sale on the relevant auction website.46
Bidder's Edge accomplishes this feat through software robots-often
called "spiders"-that automatically search the Internet for relevant infor-
mation.4 7 Bidder's Edge's spiders "crawl the web," searching auction sites,
extracting their information, and storing it in a database. 4 8 Bidder's Edge
answers user queries submitted on its site by searching this database and
returning the relevant information. 49
Bidder's Edge is an example of a "secondary aggregator," an informa-
tion aggregator that obtains its information from "primary aggregators" of
information such as eBay.50 A website qualifies as a primary aggregator if
it does not (for the most part) obtain the information it presents from
other websites. 5 1 Secondary aggregators tend to arise where information
relevant to an important decision is dispersed over a large number of pri-
mary sites. As Philip Evans and Thomas Wurster predicted in 1997, "[t]he
sheer breadth of choice available to potential customers [on the Internet]
will create the need for third parties to play the role of navigator or facili-
tating agent."
52
A number of secondary aggregators surround eBay.5 3 In 1999, eBay
launched an offensive against them, claiming they were trespassing on its
February 21, 2001, due to market and financial conditions), at http://
www.newsbytes.com/news/01/1 62050.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2001).
46. See BidXS, Welcome to the Web's Top Auction Search-Engine, at http://
www.bidxs.com/be/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2001) (describing business of company).
47. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060-61 (explaining use of software robots).
48. See id. at 1061-62 (describing Bidder's Edge's search technique). For a
general discussion of robot searches, see Martijn Koster, Robots in the Web: Threat or
Treat? [hereinafter Koster, Robots in the Web] (explaining advantages and disadvan-
tages of robot search technology), at http://sunhe.jinr.dubna.su/docs/httpd/ro-
bots/threat-or-treat.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2001). Many sites attempt to control
robot searches through the use of a robot.txt file. See id. (discussing use of robots).
As the eBay court explains:
The eBay site employs "robot exclusion headers." A robot exclusion
header is a message, sent to computers programmed to detect and re-
spond to such headers, that eBay does not permit unauthorized robotic
activity. Programmers who wish to comply with the Robot Exclusion Stan-
dard design their robots to read a particular data file, "robots.txt," and to
comply with the control directives it contains.
eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (citations omitted). For a discussion of robot exclu-
sion standards and techniques, see Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion
(describing method and giving examples of robot exclusion), at http://
info.webcrawler.com/mak/proiects/robots/norobots.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2001). For a discussion of whether the robot.txt file creates a contract between the
site and its searchers, see infra note 58.
49. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061-62 (describing spider information re-
trieval performed by Bidder's Edge).
50. See id. at 1061-62 (explaining function of Bidder's Edge).
51. See id. at 1060 (explaining eBay website).
52. Philip B. Evans & Thomas S. Wurster, Strategy and the New Economics of
Information, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 71, 77.
53. See, e.g., AuctionWatch (claiming to be "[tihe Complete Auction Manage-
ment Solution"), at http://www.auctionwatch.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2001);
[Vol. 47: p. 117
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site and insisting that they enter into license agreements if they wished to
search eBay's website. 54 Bidder's Edge took center stage in this battle in
early September 1999 when eBay informed Bidder's Edge that the latter
was not authorized to systematically search its site.5 5 When Bidder's Edge
continued to do so, eBay filed suit and requested a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the searches. 56 In granting the injunction, the District Court
for the Northern District of California held that eBay was likely to prevail
on the merits with regard to its trespass to chattels claim. 57 Indeed, the
court's discussion made clear that the court was convinced that the
searches constituted a trespass to chattels. 58
To evaluate the eBay ruling, we need to distinguish three types of rela-
tionships between primary and secondary aggregators: (1) network-effect
relationships, (2) no-network-effect relationships and (3) linking relation-
ships. Trespass claims are generally plausible in the first type of relation-
ship, while plausible only in certain instances of the second and third.
B. The First Relationship: Network-Effect
The network-effect relationship is defined by a dilemma that secon-
dary aggregators can pose for primary aggregators. The eBay/Bidder's
Edge dispute illustrates this predicament.59 The first horn of the dilemma
ChannelAdvisor, Company: Overview (claiming to aggregate "the majority of all on-
line dynamic-pricing transactions"), at http://merchant.channeladvisor.com/ca/
company.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2001); BidXS, Company Info (claiming to aggre-
gate data from up to 300 auction sites), at http://www.bidxs.com/aboutus.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2001).
54. See eBay Plays Any Angle It Can, THE STANDARD, Nov. 3, 1999 (discussing
eBay's attempt to "squash" two dozen web companies that search auction sites),
available at http://www.thestandard.com/article print/0,1153,7379,00.html (last
visited Aug. 29, 2001).
55. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (stating that eBay requested that Bidder's
Edge cease posting eBay auction listings on its site).
56. See id. at 1063 (stating that eBay moved for preliminary injunction based
on nine causes of action including trespass, false advertising, federal and state
trademark dilution, computer fraud and abuse, unfair competition, misappropria-
tion, interference with prospective economic advantage and unjust enrichment).
57. See id. at 1070 (holding that eBay was likely to prove (1) that Bidder's
Edge intentionally and without authorization interfered with eBay's possessory in-
terest in its computer system, and (2) this unauthorized use proximately resulted
in damage to eBay).
58. See id. at 1069 (stating that eBay sufficiently proved trespass claim). This
Article concerns whether the court was correct in finding a trespass to chattels. See
id. at 1071-72 (holding that Bidder's Edge trespassed on a portion of eBay's prop-
erty). This Article does not address the issue of whether the court was correct to
grant the preliminary injunction. See id. at 1073 (granting preliminary injunction).
59. See generally id. (discussing trespass problems of secondary aggregators).
This discussion is not offered as a series of empirical claims about the actual
thoughts and intentions of the corporate officers of eBay and Bidder's Edge. My
goal is to characterize the way in which primary and secondary aggregators com-
pete. eBay and Bidder's Edge illustrate the relevant competitive relationship
whether or not their corporate leadership realizes that they compete in this way.
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is that it is essential that the seller-provided information on eBay's website
be easily accessible and searchable by the public. The second horn is that
eBay needs to prevent access by its competitors to that very same
information.
1. The First Horn of the Dilemma: Easy Access by the Public
The information on eBay's website is accessible by the public in the
sense that anyone can search the website. To buy or sell items on eBay,
one must register and obtain a login username and password before con-
ducting a transaction. 60 Merely searching the items for sale, however, re-
quires neither registration nor login. 61 Easy accessibility by the public
60. See eBay, Welcome New Users (stating that in order to buy or sell on eBay,
new users need to register), at hitp://pages.ebay.com/help/basics/n-learn-
more.html?ssPageName=HP1 LearnMore (last visited Nov. 3, 2001).
61. See eBay, at http://www.eBay.com (allowing search access to all users) (last
visited Nov. 3, 2001). Open access is why contract law will not provide adequate
protection for eBay against secondary aggregators. Consider that when one regis-
ters on eBay, one agrees not to search the site for commercial purposes:
Users of the eBay site must register and agree to the eBay User Agree-
ment. Users agree to the seven page User Agreement by clicking on an "I
Accept" button located at the end of the User Agreement. The current
version of the User Agreement prohibits the use of "any robot, spider,
other automatic device, or manual process to monitor or copy our web
pages or the content contained herein without our prior expressed writ-
ten permission."
eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 (citations omitted). Bidder's Edge never registered
as a user and hence never clicked the "I Accept" button to agree to the terms of
the User Agreement. See id. (discussing Bidder's Edge's search of eBay site). Is
there an argument that Bidder's Edge is bound by the User Agreement even
though it did not click the button?
The argument would be that the User Agreement was an offer that Bidder's
Edge accepted, not by clicking on the button, rather by the act of searching the
site. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 240-45 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (arguing for this position). There are three difficulties, however, with this
argument. First, although the User Agreement is accessible through a hyperlink
on the home page, this presentation may not be sufficient to constitute an offer.
See eBay, at http://www.eBay.com (linking to User Agreement) (last visited Aug.
29, 2001). "An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so
made as tojustify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain
is invited and will conclude it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24
(1981).
In some cases, it will be dubious at best that there is a relevant "manifestation
of willingness to enter into a bargain." Id. Register.com's Service Agreement, for
example, is accessible through a hyperlink in extremely small print at the very
bottom of its home page. See Register.com, at http://www.register.com (linking to
service agreement) (last visited Aug. 29, 2001). As one scrolls down the home
page, all text and graphic content ends long before one gets to the Service Agree-
ment hyperlink. See id. (linking inconspicuously to service agreement). One has
to scroll down through approximately six inches of blank screen. See id. (linking
inconspicuously to service agreement). Is this "manifestation" sufficient?
Second, even if the agreement behind the hyperlink can be characterized as
an offer, it is unclear exactly what counts as acceptance. "Acceptance of an offer is
a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in manner in-
vited or required by the offer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50. When
[Vol. 47: p. 117
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means that potential buyers anywhere in the world can search the eBay
website to see what items are for sale; get an impression of how the website
works; and make a decision about whether registering to buy over the site
is worth the effort. Buyers need to bear the transaction costs of registra-
tion only as an immediate prelude to an initial purchase. Similarly, sellers
can search the website and see how it works before making the decision to
register. The alternative would be to require registration before any-or,
any substantial-use of the website. This would pose the registration deci-
sion to potential buyers and sellers before they had sufficient information
to determine if the benefits of registration were worth the transaction
CoSts. 6 2 Registration on eBay would be discouraged. eBay would suffer
because maintaining, and preferably expanding, its base of seven million
registered users is critical to eBay's success.
Buyers and sellers are attracted to the size of eBay's website. Buyers
search eBay because its size increases the likelihood that they will find the
items they are looking for. Sellers post items on 'the eBay website because
its size attracts the most buyers and increases the likelihood that their
items will be bought. As a result, eBay benefits from a feedback mecha-
nism that takes the form of a self-perpetuating expectation: a large number of
buyers and sellers expect a large number of buyers and sellers to use eBay,
which means that a large number of buyers and sellers will continue to
expect a large number of buyers and sellers to use eBay, which means that a
large number of buyers and sellers will continue to use eBay, which means
that a large number of buyers and sellers will continue to expect a large
number of buyers and sellers to use eBay, which means that .... This is a
"positive network effect." eBay is a vast network of buyers and sellers, and,
as the economists Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian observe:
does this happen? Not when one first accesses the site's home page because one
has not yet had a chance to read the offer. So how much does one have to do to
accept the offer? Whether offer and acceptance has occurred in these cases will
always be a factual question that differs with the facts of each case. See, e.g., id. cmt.
c, illus. 1-3 (showing how facts affect offer and acceptance).
Third, even if there has been offer and acceptance, only certain terms may be
enforceable. See id. § 211 cmt. c (discussing assent to unknown terms). In cases of
this sort, "[w]here the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting
such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular
term, the term is not part of the agreement." Id. § 211. In addition, the uncon-
scionability doctrine may further limit the enforceable terms. See id. at cmt. c (dis-
cussing review of unfair terms). The claim that a robot.txt file creates a contract
faces the same difficulties. See Koster, Standard for Robot Exclusion, supra note 48, at
http://sunhe.jinr.dubna.su/docs/httpd/robots/threat-or-treat.html (discussing
use of robot.txt files). Even if the file constitutes an offer, what counts as accept-
ance? Does a robot that does not read the file accept its terms if it searches the
site? Even if an offer is accepted, enforceable terms may be limited.
62. There is no fee for registering on eBay. See eBay, Services Overview, at
http://pages.ebay.com/services/index.html (noting free registration) (last visited
Nov. 3, 2001). The only "cost" is the time and effort of filling out the registration
forms.
15
Warner: Border Disputes: Trespass to Chattels on the Internet
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILI ANOVA LAW REVIEW
[n]etworks have a fundamental economic characteristic: the
value of connecting to a network depends on the number of other
people already connected to it. This fundamental value proposi-
tion goes under many names: network effects, network externali-
ties, and demand-side economies of scale. They all refer to
essentially the same point: other things being equal, it's better to
be connected to a bigger network than a smaller one.6 3
Reflection on eBay's positive network effect illuminates eBay's need to
control competitor access to the very same information that it makes ac-
cessible to the public. The second horn of the dilemma is examined next.
2. The Second Horn of the Dilemma: Preventing Access by Competitors
The key to understanding the second horn of the dilemma is to em-
phasize that a positive network effect is a matter of expectations. Buyers
and sellers use eBay because they expect other buyers and sellers to use it.
In general, a positive network effect takes hold as the network reaches
"critical mass."6 4 As Shapiro and Varian remark about Microsoft,
"Microsoft's dominance is based on [network effects]. Microsoft's custom-
ers value its operating systems because they are widely used, the de facto
industry standard. Rival operating systems just don't have the critical mass
to pose much of a threat."6 5 Unlike an operating system, however, it was
easy for Bidder's Edge to obtain critical mass. Bidder's Edge accom-
63. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE
TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 174-75 (1999) (emphasis in original).
64. See eBay (providing dozens of user options on home page), at http://
www.eBay.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2001). Size is not the only issue. eBay offers a
variety of other features to attract and retain users, such as escrow accounts and
dispute resolution procedures. See eBay, Professional Services (providing profes-
sional service bidding forum), at http://pages.ebay.com/professional-services/in-
dex.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2001). Despite the importance of size, smaller
auction sites can enjoy a positive network effect of their own, even in the shadow of
the giant eBay. See, e.g., http://www.acubid.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2001) (target-
ing buyers and sellers interested in antiques and collectibles). AcuBid could bene-
fit from its own network effect while co-existing with the much larger eBay. If
enough buyers and sellers find AcuBid's focus on antiques and collectibles attrac-
tive, a sufficiently large group of buyers and sellers would use the site because they
expect a sufficiently large group to use the site. If the group were large enough,
AcuBid.com could prosper in eBay's shadow under this self-perpetuating phenom-
enon. If the group of buyers is too small, however, sellers will desert the site. Con-
versely, if the group of sellers is too small, buyers will desert the site.
65. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 63, at 180. Shapiro and Varian are not clear
about the fact that the network effect is a matter of expectations. See generally id. at
173-225 (highlighting relationship between value and expectations in success of
network). They do treat positive feedback as a matter of expectations, noting that:
Positive feedback should not be confused with growth as such. Yes, if a
technology is on a roll, as is the Internet today, positive feedback trans-
lates into rapid growth: success feeds on itself. This is a virtuous cycle. But
• . . if your product is seen as failing, those very perceptions can spell
doom. The Apple Macintosh is now in this danger zone .... The virtu-
ous cycle of growth can easily change to a vicious cycle of collapse.
[Vol. 47: p. 117
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plished this by aggregating auction information from primary auction
websites. This strategy allowed Bidder's Edge to list more items for sale
than any of the primary auction websites it searched. 66 The eBay court
noted that "[a]s of March 2000, the BE [Bidder's Edge] website contained
information on more that five million items being auctioned on more
than one hundred auction sites." 6 7 Around that time, eBay had only three
million items for sale.
68
The danger to eBay is that Bidder's Edge's critical mass might under-
mine eBay's positive network effect. Critical mass is not sufficient on its
own to undercut the effect. A network effect consists of a self-perpetuat-
ing expectation, and Bidder's Edge undermines this expectation only if it
attracts buyers to its website in preference to eBay. Size is but one feature
that attracts buyers, but there are others, including reliability, website de-
Id. at 176 (emphasis in original). The point is that perceptions that a product will
not be used turn into an expectation that it will not be used. If this expectation
leads a large enough number not to use it, this will feed the expectation that it will
not be used-and so on.
Some of the confusion between size and expectations in network effects is due
to misunderstandings of Metcalfe's Law. See Charles Boyd, Why Strategy Must
Change (stating that "the usefulness, or utility, of a network equals the square of the
numbers of users"), at http://www.mgt.smsu.edu/mgt487/mgtissue/newstrat/
metcalfe.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2001). Metcalfe's Law states that: in a network of
n people, each person has the opportunity to communicate with n - 1 others, and
the total number of possible connections of others to others is n x (n -1). SeeAlun
Anderson, The Mathematics of Mayhem, THE ECONOMIST: THE WORLD IN 2001, at 117,
117 (2000) (describing Metcalfe's Law).
Some take Metcalfe's Law to measure the value of a network to its users. See,
e.g., id. (stating that value of network increases dramatically as number of users
grows). The theory is that larger networks are more valuable to users than smaller
networks, therefore Metcalfe's Law provides an approximation of a network's
value. See id. (explaining rationale for Metcalfe's Law).
The problem is that the law provides only a very rough approximation at best.
Suppose that 100 new websites appear on the web. Also suppose that these sites
have absolutely no useful information on them and no one visits them. Where n is
the number of computers connected to the web, under Metcalfe's Law, adding the
websites increases the value from n x (n - 1) to (n + 100) x (n + 100 - 1)). Clearly,
however, there is no increase in value with the addition of these websites.
Value seems to depend on the relevancy of information in addition to size. A
relevancy argument assumes that the value of a network derives partly from the
uses to which it can be put. As a result, Metcalfe's Law offers only a rough approxi-
mation of the value of a network since a network's "use-value" depends on many
factors other than size.
66. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062-63 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (discussing how Bidder's Edge took auction items from all other auc-
tion site databases). Bidder's Edge cannot hope to achieve sufficient "critical
mass" without searching eBay. See id. ("Approximately 69% of the auction items
contained in the [Bidder's Edge] database are from auctions hosted on eBay. ...
[Bidder's Edge] estimates that it would lose one-third of its users if it ceased to
cover the eBay auctions.").
67. Id. at 1061.
68. See id. at 1060 (discussing how every minute 600 bids are placed on three
million items).
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sign and ease of use. 69 For our immediate purposes, suppose that Bid-
der's Edge did succeed in attracting a large number of buyers who used it
in preference to any other auction website. Then, the more buyers who
searched through the Bidder's Edge website, the less it would matter
where a seller listed items for sale. No matter where they were listed, they
would appear on Bidder's Edge. This was indeed Bidder's Edge's goal, as
James Carney, President of Bidder's Edge explains:
At Bidder's Edge .. , our strategy is to offer an auction portal
site that makes it quick and easy for users to simultaneously
search hundreds of auction sites.... This approach not only ben-
efits users but also auction site operators. Consider how difficult
it would be for the owner of a small auction site to compete with
eBay .... Through Bidder's Edge their goods are exposed to
potential customers who otherwise might never have discovered
them. Almost anyone can establish an auction site. The bigger
issue is, how do you get buyers to show up? . . . We're now at-
tracting 450,000 to 500,000 unique users a month, and that num-
ber will continue to grow.70
Success in this endeavor for Bidder's Edge would greatly weaken the posi-
tive network effect motive of sellers to use eBay, the motive provided by
the sellers' expectation that a large number of buyers are also using it. If
buyers switch to searching through a secondary aggregator, this motive
weakens and might disappear entirely. Sellers care less about which pri-
mary auction website they use if they are confident that the items they post
for sale will also show up on a secondary aggregator's website.
This eventuality would be most unwelcome by eBay because its reve-
nue derives from the transaction fees it charges its sellers.7 1 Therefore, a
significant decrease in the number of sellers means a significant decrease
in eBay's revenue. Suppose that most buyers searched through one or
69. See Bidder's Edge Expands Coverage of Person-to-Person Online Auctions to Offer
More Items for Bid Than Any Site on the Web, Bus. WIRE, June 29, 1999 (discussing
Bidder's Edge expansion on Internet), at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/
m0EIN/ 1999_June_29/55018201/pl /article.jhtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2001). Bid-
der's Edge did not rely on size alone to attract buyers. See id. (explaining Bidder's
Edge strategy). In 1999, Bidder's Edge introduced a variety of enhancements to its
site to attract buyers. See id. ("To further the online auction user's experience,
Bidder's Edge has greatly enhanced its site, adding capabilities and features to
make it even easier for users to shop at online auctions and find great deals.").
James Carney, President of Bidder's Edge, was explicit about the plan. He states,
"The tools we offer users keep them coming back. Besides our keyword search
function, we offer time-saving micro-category searches .... Plus, we can notify
users when specific items come up for auction .... " James Carney, Bidder's Edge, at
http://www.avce.com/files/editorial/200004/odds.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2001).
70. See Carney, supra note 69, at http://www.avce.com/files/editorial/
200004/odds.html.
71. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
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more secondary aggregators. As a result, sellers did not congregate on
eBay but instead spread themselves more evenly over the hundreds of pri-
mary auction websites. Being included in a secondary aggregator's
searches would be critical to the success of a primary auction website, and
it might even be possible for secondary aggregators to extract fees from
primary websites for including them in their searches. This critical aspect
of the network effect explains why eBay has a strong motive to control
access by its competitors to the very same information it makes accessible
to the public.
This dilemma-the need to control competitor access to publicly ac-
cessible information-typifies the first relationship between primary and
secondary aggregators, the network-effect relationship. This relationship
is defined by two features. First, to attract users to its website, the primary
aggregator makes at least some information on its site easily accessible and
searchable by the public. Second, exploiting the fact that the primary's
information is searchable by the public, the secondary aggregator threat-
ens to undermine a network effect on which the primary aggregator signif-
icantly depends for revenue.
C. Balancing the Competing Interests
How, in the network-effect relationship, should we balance a business'
interest in controlling access to its website against the Internet user's inter-
est in unimpeded access to information? An Internet business should be
granted the same right that a brick-and-mortar business already enjoys: the
right to control access to its place of business. The political and economic
considerations that justify that right in the brick-and-mortar world also jus-
tify it on the Internet, and the logical doctrine to use to extend this right
to a web business is trespass to chattels. 72
In network-effect relationships, the political and economic rationales
are particularly strong. In such a relationship, the secondary aggregator
enters the primary aggregator's place of business and makes use of a cru-
cial business resource, the primary aggregator's server, for the secondary
aggregator's own purpose and profit. Moreover, in doing so the secon-
dary aggregator threatens to undercut the network effect on which the
primary aggregator depends for revenue. Telling the primary aggregator
it has no right to exclude such a secondary aggregator is difficult to square
with the paramount importance of individual freedom in democratic po-
litical organization. Individuals have, within broad limits, the moral right
not to speak and not to associate. 73
72. See supra Section I.B.
73. The point is not that a constitutional right comes into play to such cases.
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1986)
(recognizing right not to speak or not to associate with speech of others). The
point is that the considerations about freedom that motivate and justify recogniz-
ing the constitutional right also support recognizing and implementing a broad
moral right not to speak and not to associate.
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Denying the primary the right to exclude is also difficult to square
with concern over economic efficiency. Other things being equal, it is
efficient to let the primary aggregator decide if and how it will allocate its
business resources. In the brick-and-mortar world, we put such decisions
in the hands of individual market participants, and we do so partly to pro-
mote economic efficiency. These considerations comprise a compelling
case for favoring a business' interest in controlling access to its website
over the Internet user's interest in unimpeded access to information. Nev-
ertheless, countervailing considerations may exist which support the user's
interest.
In an Amicus Brief filed in support of Bidder's Edge's appeal of the
ruling, twenty-eight law professors also argue that considerations of eco-
nomic efficiency weigh in favor of the user's interest:
[t]he Internet has the potential to approximate a perfectly effi-
cient information medium because it can allow buyers to
cheaply, easily and quickly search for items they want. The role of
product comparison sites is critical to the benefits of e-com-
merce. Aggregators of product and price information, "shop-
bots" that automate the price comparison process, and compara-
tive product evaluators like Consumer Reports and its online
equivalents all reduce transactions costs and improve competi-
tion by helping consumers get fast, cheap and accurate informa-
tion about products and prices. Because search technology and
so-called "shop-bots" allow consumers to automatically identify
goods in which they are interested, the match between sellers
and buyers can approach perfect efficiency. In addition, because
there is no practical limit to the number of servers that can be
connected to the Internet, there is virtually no upper limit to the
number of sellers that can participate in what promises to be
near-perfect competition.74
The Bidder's Edge supporters advance important considerations which
will be addressed in more detail later when the two other primary/secon-
dary aggregator relationships are examined. These considerations should
not, however, be given too much weight in the context of the network-
effect relationship.
To see why, consider whether giving market participants the ability to
decide with whom they wish to share resources is more economically effi-
cient than limiting their decisional power by denying them the right to
exclude others from access to those resources. Denying primaries the
right to exclude secondaries could seriously undermine the incentive to
enter into a web business that depends on a positive network effect for
revenue. Suppose that someone is deciding whether to make a major in-
74. Brief of Amici Curiae Reed Elsevier, Inc. et al. at I.A, eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's
Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C-99-21200).
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vestment in a commercial website and in the marketing needed to draw
attention to it. Suppose that the business depends on achieving a critical
mass of information that will support a stable network effect. The incen-
tive to invest in the website might be seriously diminished if the informa-
tion it presents can be extracted and used at will by a secondary
aggregator. If investors as primary aggregators lack sufficient incentive,
secondary aggregators will not thrive, and Internet users will not enjoy the
benefits of either one.
On the other hand, granting primaries the right to exclude seconda-
ries hardly means that secondary aggregators will vanish from network-
effect relationships; rather, secondaries will have to try to negotiate license
agreements with the primaries that allow the latter to search the former's
website. In network-effect relationships, a primary aggregator could rea-
sonably enter into a license agreement with a secondary aggregator if the
compensation from the license outweighed the risk of an undermined net-
work effect. In assessing this risk, it is important to remember that critical
mass alone is not sufficient to undercut a positive network effect. The
secondary aggregator must undermine the expectation that large numbers
of people will use the primary aggregator's website. 75 A primary aggrega-
tor confident about the attractive power of its website may not worry
greatly that secondary aggregators will destroy its network effect. Indeed,
eBay evidently finds that it can strike an acceptable balance between risk
and competition as it readily enters into license agreements with secon-
dary aggregators.76
In the network-effect relationship, granting primary aggregators the
right to exclude secondary aggregators promotes the license agreement
solution. Lack of clarity about such legal rights may well have contributed
to the collapse of the eBay/Bidder's Edge negotiations into litigation. 77
Suppose that both parties had been clear that eBay had the legal right to
exclude Bidder's Edge from its website. Bidder's Edge might well have
avoided fruitless litigation by entering into a license agreement with eBay
or by simply ceasing to search eBay's website. On the other hand, had it
been clear to the parties that Bidder's Edge had the right to search eBay's
website, eBay might simply have acquiesced to the searches; or, eBay might
have offered Bidder's Edge a license agreement in which eBay agreed to
assist Bidder's Edge in its searching of eBay in exchange for compensation
75. For a discussion of how Bidder's Edge undertook to draw eBay users to its
site, see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
76. Brief of Amici Curiae Reed Elsevier, Inc. et al. at 13, eBay (No. C-99-
21200). eBay's licensing agreements with secondary aggregators "limit[ ] the
amount and nature of crawling activity on [its] site." eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1068.
Bidder's Edge and eBay had a license agreement at one time, and they were nego-
tiating another when the negotiations broke and litigation ensued. See id. at 1062
(noting that Bidder's Edge had ninety-day preliminary license while negotiations
were taking place).
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or other concessions. These types of agreements are not uncommon for
eBay; it actively seeks agreements with just this character. 78
Clarity about the legal framework facilitates negotiation and mini-
mizes costly litigation. Such clarity is particularly important in the pri-
mary/secondary aggregator context because conflict in that context is
inevitable. Secondary aggregators have a strong market motive to search
primary aggregators as that is their business. Primary aggregators will inev-
itably see themselves, whether correctly or incorrectly, as threatened by a
secondary aggregator and therefore will want to prevent or control the
secondary aggregator's access. Lack of clarity in such a context of conflict
breeds failed negotiations and can lead to costly litigation.
7 9
This Article next examines no-network-effect relationships, where the
secondary aggregator does not threaten to undermine the primary aggre-
gator's network effect. The balancing calculus in no-network-effect rela-
tionships, however, is more complex. In some instances of this type of
relationship, a business's interest in controlling access to its website out-
weighs the Internet user's interest in unimpeded access to information. In
other instances, the opposite is true. It is worth emphasizing that the "net-
work-effect" and "no-network-effect" relationships are not mutually exclu-
sive. The same secondary aggregator may have a network-effect
relationship with one primary aggregator and simultaneously have a no-
network-effect relationship with another.
III. No-NETWORK-EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS
A secondary aggregator cannot undercut a network effect that does
not exist. Not all primary aggregators depend on a network effect for rev-
enue, so secondary aggregators searching the primary site do not imperil
any such effect. As Shapiro and Varian emphasize, not "all information
78. See Ed Ritchie, eBay Opens Up (discussing new program enabling outsider
to access eBay's technology), at http://www.auctionwatch.com/awdaily/daily
news/november00/1-1 12000.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2001).
79. See generally Ira Magaziner, At the Crossroads of Law and Technology: Keynote
Address, October 23, 1999, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (2000) (discussing how
Internet is transforming society). This counts heavily against a "hands-off, let the
industry regulate itself" approach. See id. (discussing regulatory strategy). The
point is important because self-regulation is particularly attractive in regard to the
Internet. See id. (explaining regulatory strategy in regard to Internet). Comment-
ing on the Clinton administration's approach to the Internet, Magaziner remarks
that "one very important principle underlying our Internet policy was ... to first
let private sector leadership try to develop the rules of the road for the Internet
through private collective action." Id. Magaziner's main reason for this policy is
that "the Internet moves too quickly. The processes of government are too slow,
inflexible, and bureaucratic to effectively address Internet changes. And we were
afraid that the development of the Internet would be strangled by excessive gov-
ernment regulation and intrusion." Id. at 1169. In the case of primary and secon-
dary aggregators, clarifying the legal framework would not be "excessive
government regulation and intrusion." Id. at 1173. On the contrary, such regula-
tion would provide a workable foundation for the negotiation of license agree-
ments. See id.
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infrastructure markets are dominated by the forces of positive feed-
back."80 The Sports Authority, an online retailer of sporting goods, is an
example of a primary aggregator that does not depend on a positive net-
work effect for revenue. Consider how The Sports Authority describes
itself:
Thesportsauthority.com-Name your sport. We have all the
name-brand gear you need at the best prices. When you're look-
ing for a wide variety of top-brand sports gear, go to the source
and cash in on the best prices. With our 150% lowest online
price guarantee and 24-hour customer service, you can be sure of
getting the best quality on the Internet.8 1
The appeal is not "Buy from us because you can expect a lot of other
people to buy from us," but rather "Buy from us because we offer the best
combination of price, quality and service." The Sports Authority depends
on the success of this appeal for its revenue, in contrast to eBay's depen-
dence on the operation of a network effect.8 2 Like eBay, however, The
Sports Authority website is publicly accessible and searchable. The website
puts as few barriers as possible in the way of a potential customer that
wants to take a look at its store. Secondary aggregators can exploit this
fact to search the site. A secondary aggregator that searches The Sports
Authority may very well assist the retailer in presenting and profiting from
its offer of the best combination of price, quality and service.
Consider, for example, the relationship between The Sports Authority
and mySimon. mySimon is a secondary aggregator that collects and
presents information from other online stores.8 3 For example, searching
mySimon for "Swiss army knife" yields a long list of online stores, includ-
ing The Sports Authority, that offer that item. mySimon almost certainly
benefits The Sports Authority.8 4 Suppose a buyer using mySimon is inter-
80. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 63, at 186 (emphasis in original).
81. mySimon, Merchant Profile: The Sports Authority, at http://www.mysimon.
com/ merchant/ index.jhtml? pgid- profile & c=camping accessories & v= I& mcid =
6189 (last visited Nov. 3, 2001).
82. Having said this, we should note that The Sports Authority could profit
from a network effect. People do sometimes go to commercial establishments be-
cause they expect others to go there. See generally Renee Dye, The Buzz on Buzz,
HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 139 (discussing effect of word-of-mouth pro-
motion). Restaurants are an obvious example. Pastis is a French bistro in New
York City's trendy meat market district where people go to "see and be seen." That
is, they go because they expect others-the right others-to go. Such network
effects can be very important. See id. ("People like to share their experiences with
one another-the restaurant where they ate lunch, the movie they saw over the
weekend, the computer they just bought-and when those experiences are
favorable, the recommendations can snowball, resulting in runaway success.").
83. See mySimon, Backgrounder, at http://www.mysimon.com/corporate/in-
dex.jhtml?pgid=backgrounder (last visited Nov. 3, 2001) (explaining that my
Simon is "the largest comparison shopping site on the Web").
84. This is not to deny that The Sports Authority could profit from a "fad-
type" network effect. The point is that mySimon would not undercut such an ef-
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ested in Swiss army knives. Without the mySimon search, the buyer might
not know that The Sports Authority carries Swiss army knives or might be
unaware of the existence of The Sports Authority at all. mySimon provides
a very inexpensive way for The Sports Authority to reach potential custom-
ers when compared to the costs of traditional marketing methods.8 5
Traditional marketing methods are expensive and of limited effectiveness.
A potential buyer might not get information about Swiss army knives for
any number of reasons. For example, those knives may not have been
mentioned in a particular brochure, advertisement or telemarketing sales
pitch; the buyer may not have been included in the mailing list; or the
buyer may not buy the magazines in which the company advertises.
mySimon helps The Sports Authority get its price/quality/service message
to potential customers. The potential downside for primary aggregators is
stiffer competition on price. mySimon's search service makes it easier for
buyers to comparison shop. The Sports Authority is not the only store
which sells Swiss army knives-a search on mySimon returns many such
stores among which a buyer can compare prices.8 6
A. Defining the No-Network-Effect Relationship
mySimon and The Sports Authority illustrate a no-network-effect rela-
tionship between a secondary and a primary aggregator. Two conditions
define this relationship. First, to attract users to its website, the primary
aggregator makes (at least some) information on its site easily accessible to
the public. Second, exploiting that fact, the secondary aggregator
searches the primary but does not thereby undercut a positive network
effect on which the primary depends for revenue.
Search engines are important examples of no-network-relationships.
Search engines are secondary aggregators.8 7 They use spiders to systemat-
ically search other websites, extract their information and compile it in a
database. For example, when a user asks a search engine to find informa-
fect. On the contrary, it would be just one more route by which people could find
their way to The Sports Authority.
85. Richard Wise & David Morrison, Beyond the Exchange: The Future of B2B,
HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 88 (stating that information aggregators pro-
vide "access to more buyers with only a modest increase in marketing cost").
86. See id. (noting that potential downside for primary aggregators of online
shopping services is stiffer competition on price). Of course, The Sports Author-
ity, with its "110% lowest online price guarantee," has chosen to compete on price.
See The Sports Authority (guaranteeing customers receive 110% of difference be-
tween purchase price and lower price of identical item found on-line), at http://
www.thesportsauthority.com/home/index.jsp (providing link to guarantee) (last
visited Nov. 3, 2001).
87. These examples of shopping services and search engines should not lead
us to overlook the fact that these are not the only secondary aggregators that stand
in no-network-effect relationships to primary aggregators. Such relationships are
extremely common. Any website that compiles a list of links to other sites qualifies
as a secondary aggregator. The website need not compile the list through the
automated efforts of a spider. The list might be manually compiled instead.
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tion about Swiss army knives, it searches the database and produces a list
of links to web pages containing (hopefully) relevant information. Unlike
a shopping service such as mySimon, a search engine will list not only
stores selling Swiss army knives, but also will list web pages containing any
kind of information about such knives. Shopping services are really just
search engines with a more specialized purpose. Like shopping services,
search engines can benefit the primary sites they search by leading users to
them. This is an essential e-commerce function-a store cannot sell to
buyers that cannot find it.
Not all no-network-effect relationships, however, are as benign as the
one between mySimon and The Sports Authority. They spread out along a
continuum, a fact that is critical to balancing the business' interest in con-
trolling access against the user's interest in unimpeded access. At one end
of the continuum are the relationships that benefit the primary site. At
the other end are the cases in which the secondary harms the primary.
The relationship between meta-search engines and ordinary search en-
gines illustrate the "harm" end of this continuum. A meta-search engine is
a secondary aggregator that searches the databases of other search en-
gines, which play the role of primary aggregators relative to the meta-
search engine.88 Like other secondary aggregators, meta-search engines
periodically send spiders to the primary search sites, extract their data,
and store it in its own database. They offer the typical advantage of a
secondary aggregator: a single search on a meta-search engine aggregates
results from multiple search engines in one convenient place.
Meta-search engines, however, can also pose a serious revenue threat
to primary search engines.89 When Internet users employ meta-search en-
gines in preference to regular search engines, traffic on the latter sites
decreases, and decreased traffic can translate into lost revenue. Whether
and to what extent a meta-search engine poses such a threat to a regular
search engine is a complex factual question, and it would not be unreason-
88. See Dogpile, Press Center ("[A] metasearch engine ... leverages more than
a dozen of the Web's leading search engines .... ), at http://www.dogpile.com/t/
help/press (last visited Nov. 3, 2001).
89. The threat is not that a positive network effect will be undercut. Search
engine revenue comes from advertising and from fees for preferential listings. See
Google, Google Inc. Business Overview (explaining business model of search engine
Google), at http://www.google.com/press/overviewbiz.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2001). Sites sometimes pay a fee to be listed above their competitors in the list of
hyperlinks the search engine produces in response to a user query. See Google,
Advertising Programs (explaining ways in which advertisers can do business with
search engine), at http://www.google.com/ads/index.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2001). A network effect may appear to be operating here because sites do adver-
tise on search engines and pay for preferential listings in part because they expect
a large number of people to use the search engine. To achieve a network effect,
however, a large number of users have to use the search engine because they ex-
pect a large number of websites to advertise there. In reality, users use search
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able to expect no-network-effect relationships between meta-search en-
gines and regular search engines to spread out over the full extent of the
benefit/harm continuum. This Article, however, is not concerned with
the statistical distribution of relationships over this continuum; rather, it
focuses on how the law should respond to relationships along this contin-
uum however those relationships happen to be distributed.
B. Balancing the Competing Interests
1. Balancing at the Benefit End of the Continuum
In no-network-effect relationships at the benefit end of the contin-
uum, a right to exclude secondary aggregators should not be granted to
primary aggregators. A comparison with network-effect relationships
reveals the reason. In both network-effect and no-network-effect relation-
ships, the secondary aggregator uses the primary's business resources for
its own commercial purposes. In network-effect relationships, the secon-
dary's actions threaten to undermine a positive network effect that the
primary depends on for revenue. In no-network-effect relationships, how-
ever, there is no network effect to undermine. In addition, in relation-
ships located toward the benefit end of the continuum, the secondary
helps the primary.9 (l Therefore, a minimal invasion of individual freedom
is involved in allowing the secondary to search the primary. The primary
is not being asked to tolerate a threat from a competitor; rather, it is being
asked to benefit from a business ally.
Economic considerations also support denying the primary the right
to exclude. In the network-effect relationships, granting the primary a
right to exclude was necessary so that it could control a threat to its source
of revenue and to promote the formation of license agreements. 9 1 Such
agreements contribute to a market setting for network-effect relationships
in which both primary and secondary aggregators can thrive and users can
enjoy the benefits of both. 92 In no-network-effect relationships at the ben-
efit end of the continuum, helping both primaries and secondaries thrive
is also the long-run goal. The problem for no-network-effect relationships
is that granting a right to exclude may work against realizing this goal.
Primary aggregators may use the right to achieve short-run gains through
price discrimination that undermine the long-run goal.9 3 The Amici cap-
ture this concern well:
90. For a discussion of the network-effect and no-network-effect relationships,
see supra notes 59-99 and accompanying text. At the harm end of the continuum,
the secondary aggregator reduces the primary's revenue, but not by tndercutting
a network effect.
91. For a discussion about why granting the primary a right to exclude is nec-
essary to control a threat to its source of revenue, see supra notes 72-79 and accom-
panying text.
92. For a discussion about the beneficial effect of license agreements in net-
work-effect relationships, see supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
93. See Burk, supra note 6, at 51-52 (arguing similar point).
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While many companies will want their public pages to appear in
search engines, others may not. Alternatively, and more likely,
sites may insist upon selective or preferential indexing. Web sites
might cut exclusive deals with one search engine, and refuse ac-
cess to the rest. They may demand preferential treatment from
search engines, so that their pages appear above anyone else's.
They may want their pages to appear to certain individuals but
not others. If the law gives owners of publicly accessible Web
sites the power to control searches, it will help create a world in
which the price any given consumer finds when she searches for
a book or other commodity is a function of what the searched
site knows about her age, income, prior buying habits, and the
like. This form of sophisticated price discrimination isn't possi-
ble if information about prices is freely available. But it is possi-
ble if every company on the Web can control the circumstances
under which people can search for it.
94
The worry is that allowing primaries to exclude search engines will greatly
reduce the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the search-engines' in-
dex to the vast array of information that is the web.
The point is not that this is likely to happen; the point is that there is
an adequate justification for foreclosing the possibility that it might by not
granting primaries a right to exclude. The justification is that a minimal
limitation on individual freedom is worth the substantial gain in overall
welfare that effective, comprehensive search-engine indexing offers. With-
out indexing, there is no effective use of the web for any cultural, commer-
cial, political or private end. In no-network-effect relationships at the
benefit end of the continuum, the primary does not need the right to
defend against any business threat. Its only use would be to allow prima-
ries to dictate to search engines the conditions under which they may con-
duct their searches. Search engines, however, should operate largely
unimpeded in order to promote e-commerce market.
This treatment of no-network-effect relationships on the Internet has
parallels in the brick-and-mortar world. We often require those who bene-
fit from a network to tolerate infringements of their freedom in order to
maintain the character and quality of the network. Zoning ordinances, for
example, control the distribution of commercial and residential real estate
along the network of public roads and walkways, and such ordinances
sometime define when and where a business may open its doors to the
[A] particular use of the local system may be locally objectionable but
globally beneficial, as is arguable in the case for . . . AuctionWatch's ag-
gregate search service .... eBay may hope to avoid the local burden of
networking by legal exclusion, but this eventually will result in suppres-
sion of the positive externalities of networking.
Id. at 52.
94. Brief of Amici Curiae Reed Elsevier, Inc. et al. at I.B, eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's
Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C-99-21200).
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public.9 5 Another example: cities that experience significant snowfall typi-
cally require businesses to shovel the snow from the sidewalk in front of
their establishment to benefit both the business and the general public.
Speed limits similarly illustrate the point. They regulate the flow of traffic
over the transportation network and benefit the general public by making
the roads safer and reducing energy consumption and environmental
pollution.
2. Balancing at the Harm End of the Continuum
Consider a relationship between a meta-search engine and a regular
search engine where the activities of the former significantly reduce the
latter's revenue. The impact on revenue makes this situation similar to a
network-effect relationship and, as in such relationships, political and eco-
nomic considerations make a powerful case for granting the primary the
right to exclude the secondary. In both cases, the secondary aggregator
enters the primary aggregator's place of business, uses a crucial business
resource-the server-for the secondary aggregator's own purposes and
profit. In cases at the harm end of the continuum, the secondary's activity
also undermines the primary's source of revenue by reducing traffic on its
website.
As in network-effect cases, insisting that a primary aggregator tolerate
such an invasion conflicts with our right not to speak and not to associ-
ate.9 6 Economic considerations also support granting the primary the
right to exclude the secondary. It is efficient to allow primary aggregators
to decide if and how they will allocate their business resources, all other
things being equal. At the harm end of no-network-effect relationships,
there is no worry that the primary will use the right to exclude to achieve
short-run gains that undermine the interest in low-cost communication
and unimpeded access to information. Just the opposite: effective, com-
prehensive search engines are critical to advancing that interest, and
granting search engines the right to exclude meta-search engines allows
search engines to protect themselves from the meta-search engine threat.
Allowing search engines to defend themselves does not mean that
meta-search engines will disappear. Rather, it means that they will have to
negotiate license agreements with regular search engines. Granting
search engines the right to exclude promotes the development of sustaina-
ble, mutually beneficial business relationships between meta-search en-
gines and regular search engines. Such relationships would ensure that
Internet users continue to enjoy the benefits of both types of search
engines.
95. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (hold-
ing that mechanism enabling customer to watch nude dancing violated ordinance
that prohibited nude dancing in borough).
96. For a discussion of how forcing a primary aggregator to tolerate a secon-
dary's invasion conflicts with our negative free speech rights, see supra notes 19-21
and accompanying text.
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It would be reasonable for a regular search engine to enter such an
agreement if the compensation outweighed the risk posed by the meta-
search engine, and in assessing the risk, it is important to bear in mind
that the comprehensiveness of the search is not the only reason that users
choose a search engine. Yahoo!, for example, deliberately limits the
amount of information it presents to users so as not to overwhelm them
with irrelevant items.9 7 Yahoo! also categorizes the information it presents
in ways that other search engines do not.9 8 If a regular search engine is
confident in the attractive power of its website, the threat presented by a
particular meta-search engine may not be so great as to make a license
agreement unacceptable. 99
3. Balancing Between the Extremes of Benefit and Harm
At the harm end of the continuum, the user's interest in low-cost
communication and unimpeded access to information outweighs the busi-
ness' interest in controlling access. At the benefit end, the business' inter-
est prevails. How should these interests be balanced between these
extremes? It would be wrong to give a definite answer. Limited experi-
ence with e-commerce markets and its enabling technology makes it diffi-
cult to determine the right trade-off between individual freedom and
economic efficiency. In such a situation, one wants a flexible position that
both responds to present needs while retaining the ability to adjust to fu-
ture developments. The doctrine of trespass to chattels provides just such
a tool.
C. Information Aggregation Versus Linking
The benefits and harms discussed above derive from information ag-
gregation. It is essential to distinguish information aggregation from link-
ing, and in particular deep linking. A link is a hypertext pointer to a
website's home page; a deep link is a link to a page in the interior of a
website. For example, if on the mySimon website a buyer clicks on the
Swiss army knife offering from The Sports Authority, it connects not to
The Sports Authority's home page, but to an interior page where the item
can be purchased. Deep linking is ubiquitous, and the reason is obvious:
it greatly aids web navigation. If the link was to the home page, the buyer
97. See Yahoo!, How Does Yahoo! Search Work (explaining how search engine
conducts and presents information), at http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/ysearch/
ysearch-02.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2001).
98. See Yahoo! (providing numerous categories by which to access information
on Internet), at http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2001).
99. Although Amazon.com is not a search engine, it provides an excellent
example of confidence in the attractive power of a website. "Amazon.com has not
tried to block the bots, even though customers can use them to find cheaper prices
elsewhere on the Web. 'They haven't hurt Amazon materially because Amazon is
giving such a great package of services .... There are a million things to keep the
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following the link would still have to search the website for the knife
purchasing page. Such searches can be time-consuming and are not al-
ways successful. In addition, many primary sites lack a thorough search
function, making a particular piece of information extremely difficult to
find. Deep links eliminate navigational nightmares, which is why virtually
every secondary aggregator employs them.
Without the navigational benefits of linking, users would still enjoy
the benefits and harms that result from information aggregation. Secon-
dary aggregators could still gather and present information acquired from
primary websites. mySimon could still produce its list of stores in response
to a search for "Swiss army knife." Although the search results would not
deep link directly to the purchase pages of the relevant stores' websites,
the secondary's information aggregation would still offer primary aggre-
gators an effective, low-cost way to reach potential customers. Similarly for
meta-search engines, their information aggregation function would still
harm regular search engines if users preferred their more comprehensive
aggregation of information to regular search engines' less comprehensive
collections.
Linking, as distinct from information aggregation, is the definitive
feature of the third relationship between primary and secondary aggre-
gators. Secondary aggregators link in both network-effect and no-network-
effect relationships, and linking relationships are not confined to those
two categories. Although virtually every website links and deep links, this
Article focuses on relationships between primary and secondary aggre-
gators; however, the discussion is generally applicable to any linking
relationship.
IV. LINKING RELATIONSHIPS
Linking is an independent source of trespass to chattels claims. Cre-
ating the link is not a trespass because the mere creation involves no ac-
cess to the linked-to site. Access occurs when the link is used, and the use
may lead to trespass liability for the link's creator. Consider a non-In-
ternet analogy. Suppose company Y rents factory space from Company X.
The space contains a machine that Y would like to use, but, unable to
reach a rental agreement with Y for use of the machine, X locks the switch
that starts the machine. Jones, a disgruntled, former employee of X, ob-
tains the key to the lock and, without any authorization, unlocks the switch
knowing and intending that Y will use the machine, which it does. Jones is
liable for trespass to chattels as he intentionally and foreseeably contrib-
uted to the unauthorized use of the machine. Links operate the same way.
The linking website knowingly and intentionally facilitates access to the
linked-to website. If the access is a trespass, the linking site will be liable.
Like no-network-effect relationships, linking relationships lie along a
harm-benefit continuum, a fact critical to balancing the business' interest
in controlling access against the user's interest in unimpeded access.
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A. Balancing at the Benefit End of the Continuum
The primary aggregator benefits from linking because users can navi-
gate to its website more easily. Search engines, for example, benefit pri-
mary aggregators by driving traffic to their websites, and the effectiveness
of search engines depends in part on linking. Search engines index the
Internet, an activity which requires identifying the location of the indexed
information. Just as a book index would be useless if it did not identify
what page to find the indexed information, search engines would not be
effective without identifying a web page to which the user could connect.
Such links typically will be deep links because to link to a home page
would often be like a book index entry that simply referred to a whole
book instead of a particular page of interest. Search engines' search
software-the spiders-also depend on links to create their web indi-
ces.'" )° Interfering with a secondary's freedom to link will reduce the use-
fulness and comprehensiveness of the information search engines return.
In linking relationships at the benefit end of the continuum, a pri-
mary should not be granted a right to exclude. As in no-network-effect
relationships at the benefit end of that continuum, linking relationships
which benefit the primary do not necessitate such a right-no threat to
the primary's business exists against which the primary must defend. The
right could only be used to secure short-run gains which might reduce the
navigational benefits of linking. For example, charging fees for linking
may reduce the number of links returned in a user search and hence the
effectiveness of search engines. Denying the primary the right to exclude
forecloses this possibility. A minimal invasion of freedom (the link by the
secondary into the primary's site) secures the navigational benefits of link-
ing on the Internet.
B. Balancing at the Harm End of the Continuum
Despite its many benefits, linking can harm a website. Even a link to a
home page, as opposed to deep link, can have undesirable associative ef-
fects. The "Babes on the Web" controversy illustrates this point:
Babes on the Web was a web site consisting of links to the home
pages of certain women whose sites included their photographs.
The links were accompanied by a desirability rating. When a
number of women objected to their inclusion on the Babes on
the Web site, the site's operator eventually removed the links to
the objecting sites. 10 1
100. See Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion, supra note 48, at http://
sunhe.jinr.dubna.su/docs/httpd/robots/threat-or-treat.htm ("WWW robots (also
called wanderers or spiders) are programs that traverse many pages in the World
Wide Web by recursively retrieving linked pages.").
101. O'Rourke, supra note 23, at 643.
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The chief culprit in harmful linking relationships, however, is the deep
link, which can harm primary sites in four ways.
First, deep linking bypasses advertising on the primary's home page
or on other pages that the user would normally pass through to get to the
deep-linked page. This can reduce the effectiveness of the advertising and
therefore the price advertisers are willing to pay a website owner to adver-
tise. Second, deep linking can reduce the number of items the primary
website sells to a buyer. Buyers shopping for one item and coming across
others on the same website may make additional purchases. Deep links
reduce cross-selling opportunities because they take the user directly to
the page where the item searched for can be purchased. Deep linking
also limits opportunities to sell the customer a more expensive item than
the one originally searched for. Third, eliminating a buyer's need to navi-
gate through the primary's website from its home page reduces the ability
to collect data on website browsing behavior. This data is often crucial
both to marketing and to improving site design.
Finally, deep linking can interfere with the user's experience at the
primary's website. One of eBay's complaints about Bidder's Edge, which
deep-linked into eBay, was that it deprived users of the general experience
of eBay. 10 2 The experience came from navigating the site from home
page to purchase page. 103 This claim is more substantial then it may seem
at first. Brick-and-mortar stores strive to offer a particular kind of experi-
ence to their customers. Nieman Marcus and Target, for example, offer
very different experiences. The buyer experience becomes associated with
a business and can become part of the set of customer attitudes and expec-
tations that form a company's brand. "A brand is a distinctive identity that
differentiates a relevant, enduring, and credible promise of value associ-
ated with a product, service, or organization, and indicates the source of
that promise." 10 4 A successful brand is a considerable business asset; the
credible promise of value attracts and retains customers.
At the harm end of the linking relationship continuum, the primary
should be granted the right to exclude the secondary. As with relation-
ships at the harm end of the no-network-effect continuum, the secondary
in a linking relationship provides access to the primary's place of business
for the secondary's own purposes and profit. This activity undermines the
primary's ability to do business and interact with its customers as it sees fit,
violating its right not to speak and not to associate.
Economically, allowing primary aggregators to decide if and how they
will allocate their business resources is efficient. Primaries will not use the
right to achieve short-run gains that undermine the user's interest in low-
102. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (characterizing actions of Bidder's Edge as equivalent of "sending in an
army of 100,000 robots a day to check the prices in a competitor's store").
103. See id. at 1061 (explaining use of eBay's website).
104. Scott Ward, Larry Light & Jonathan Goldstine, What High-Tech Managers
Need to Know About Brands, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 85, 88.
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cost communication and unimpeded access to information; rather, pri-
mary aggregators need the right to exclude to defend against business
threats from secondary aggregators. Granting this defense promotes the
user's interest in unimpeded access to information because primary busi-
nesses have to thrive if they are to exist to be searched by secondary aggre-
gators. Giving primaries the right to exclude means that secondary
aggregators will negotiate license agreements with primaries that allow
linking. As with no-network-effect relationship at the harm end of that
continuum, this promotes the development of sustainable, mutually bene-
ficial linking relationships between primaries and secondaries that ensure
that users enjoy the benefits of both.
Dealing with linking relationships that exist in the middle of the ben-
efit-harm continuum presents the same complex factual question as was
presented by no-network-effect relationships in the middle of its benefit-
harm continuum.10 5 A definitive answer to the balancing question is just
as elusive for linking relationships because the economic and technologi-
cal situation is too new, too fluid and too ill-understood. Again, the doc-
trine of trespass to chattels will provide a framework flexible enough to
deal with each case effectively.
C. Summary of Primary and Secondary Relationships
Three relationships between primary and secondary aggregators have
been distinguished: network-effect; no-network-effect; and linking. This
Article has argued for allowing a web business control over access to its
place of business in the network-effect relationship and in certain in-
stances of no-network-effect and linking relationships. The remaining
doctrinal question concerns whether trespass to chattels provides a frame-
work that, when applied to these relationships, yields the desired
consequences.
Burk contends that trespass to chattels fails in this regard. He insists
that "the elements of common law trespass to chattels fit poorly in the
context of cyberspace,"'' 1 6 and that its application is "fraught with unin-
tended and undesirable consequences." 10 7 This Article argues the oppo-
site-that trespass to chattels is a workable doctrine for addressing control
over property in cyberspace. Initially, this argument is presented in the
context of network-effect relationships between secondary and primary ag-
gregators. Then, the argument is expanded to show that trespass to chat-
tels works successfully for no-network-effect and linking relationships as
well.
105. For a discussion of the complex factual question presented by no-net-
work-effect relationships in the middle of the continuum, see supra section lII.B.3.
106. Burk, supra note 6, at 39.
107. Id. at 28.
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V. TREsPASS TO CHATTELS IN NETWORK-EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS
Trespass to a chattel occurs when one intentionally "dispossess[es]
another of the chattel" or "us[es] or intermeddl[es] with a chattel in the
possession of another."j°8 In e-commerce, the relevant portion is "using
or intermeddling" with a chattel. The use must invade the possessory
rights of the owner. 1'0 1 In such cases, one "who commits a trespass to a
chattel is subject to liability to the possessor of the chattel if... the chattel
is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value."' II( Returning to the
eBay/Bidder's Edge dispute, this Article next examines whether Bidder's
Edge intentionally used a chattel in a way that invaded the possessory
rights of eBay and impaired the condition, quality or value of the chattel.
A. Intentional Use of eBay's Server
Trespass to chattels requires intentional physical contact with the
chattel. II' As the eBay court noted, Bidder's Edge's searches of eBay's
server satisfy this requirement: "[Bidder's Edge]'s activities consume at
least a portion of plaintiff's bandwidth and server capacity. Although
there is some dispute as to the percentage of queries on eBay's site for
which [Bidder's Edge] is responsible, [Bidder's Edge] admits that it sends
some 80,000 to 100,000 requests to plaintiff's computer systems per
day."' 12
The claim that electronic access satisfies the physical contact require-
ment is controversial. Burk challenges this claim. He argues that elec-
tronic access is not the kind of contact required by trespass to chattels.'
1 3
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1977).
109. See id. "In order to prevail on a claim for trespass based on accessing a
computer system, the plaintiff must establish . . . [that] defendant intentionally
and without authorization interfered with plaintiff's possessory interest in the com-
puter system .... eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-70
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217, cmt. c. Comment c of section
217 explains:
One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to the pos-
sessor of the chattel if
(a) he dispossessed the other of the chattel, or
(b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or
(c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substan-
tial time, or
(d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to
some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected
interest.
Id.
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 cmt. d (defining
"intermeddling").
112. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
113. See Burk, supra note 6, at 32-34 (exploring lack of physical contact when
dealing with "trespass of electrons"). Burk notes that "trespass to chattels requires
some type of physical contact with the chattel." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 217-218).
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Burk focuses primarily on Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 114 a case cited as pre-
cedent in eBay.1 '5 In Bezenek, two teenage boys hacked into a long-distance
telephone system and placed a large number of unauthorized calls.
11 6
The California Court of Appeals ruled that electronic access met the physi-
cal contact requirement of trespass to chattels.' 17 The court contended
that "the requirement of a tangible intrusion to chattels has been relaxed
almost to the point of being discarded. " '18 It supported this claim by cit-
ing cases in which intrusion by microscopic particles, smoke and other
"migrating intangibles" were seen as sufficient to support a trespass
claim. 1 9 The Bezenek court concluded that "the electronic signals gener-
ated by the boys' activities were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass
cause of action."
120
Burk complains that the cases the Bezenek court cited concerned tres-
pass to land while the conclusion the court reached concerned trespass to
chattels. z12 But why should this matter? The court is faced with technol-
ogy that has created new ways to intrude into new types of chattels. The
kind of access for which a long-distance telephone system or a computer
server is designed is electronic access. To refuse to count electronic sig-
nals as the kind of contact required for trespass to a computer server
would be a mistake-one which looked steadfastly back at the past while
ignoring our technologically-changing present. The Bezenek court took ac-
count of both the past and the present. Confronted with a trespass to
chattels claim in the novel context of unauthorized electronic access to a
long-distance phone system, and lacking trespass to chattels cases on
point, the court reasoned by analogy with trespass to land cases to reach its
conclusion. 12 2 Surely, this is exactly what it should have done.
B. Invasion of eBay's Possessory Interest
To qualify as a trespass to chattels, Bidder's Edge's searches must in-
vade eBay's possessory right. Using a chattel in an unauthorized way is
114. 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559 (1996).
115. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-71 (discussing relevant tort claim).
116. See Thrifty-Tel, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1563-64 (examining facts of case).
117. See id. at 1567 n.6 (concluding that electronic signals are sufficiently tan-
gible to support trespass to chattels claim).
118. Id.
119. See id. (analogizing trespass by electronic impulses to trespass by invisible
particles).
120. Id.
121. See Burk, supra note 6, at 33 (arguing trespass to land case not applicable
to trespass to chattels). "The 'particulate trespass' cases relied upon in Thrifty-Tel
were largely cases in which the owner of real property had been dispossessed of the
use of land by contamination." Id. at 33-34.
122. See Thrifty-Tel, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1566-67 (comparing trespass to chattels
with conversion). The California Court of Appeals noted that "[a]pparently, no
California decision has applied a trespass theory to computer hacking." Id. at 1567
n.7.
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sufficient for the invasion of a possessory right.123 The searches would
certainly appear to be unauthorized given that eBay explicitly informed
Bidder's Edge that it was not authorized to search its server. 124
The counter-argument is that, by linking its server to the Internet and
maintaining a website accessible to the public, eBay had consented to Bid-
der's Edge's use of its server. As the court stated, "[Bidder's Edge] argues
that it cannot trespass eBay's website because the site is publicly accessi-
ble."125 Talk of implied consent is talk of what a rational, adequately in-
formed person would explicitly consent to under conditions that allow for
adequate reflection free from undue influence.' 2 6 eBay does impliedly
consent to access by anyone on the Internet. Indeed, eBay has a compel-
ling business reason to make its site accessible to the public, so if eBay
were asked if it consented to access by anyone on the Internet, its answer
would certainly be in the affirmative-within broad limits.
The "within broad limits" qualification is crucial. Consent conferred
by connecting to the Internet is clearly limited in scope. Commenting on
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 127 in which Cyber Promotions ad-
vanced the same implied consent argument, Burk emphasizes that:
CompuServe . . . and others whose machines are connected to
the network have in some sense invited public usage of their
equipment. But the terms of such an invitation are murky....
[I]t seems unlikely that by connecting to the network, Com-
puServe has opened its facilities to every conceivable use-for ex-
ample, we would hardly infer that CompuServe's Internet
connection constituted an invitation to commit computer crimes
on its system . . . by "hacking" its servers to delete data, or to
establish a free user account. 128
The eBay court reached the same conclusion as Burk. The court held that
Bidder's Edge's searches fell outside the scope of the consent eBay
granted to the public, stating that "eBay does not generally permit the type
of automated access made by [Bidder's Edge]. In fact, eBay explicitly noti-
fies automated visitors that their access is not permitted." 129 Moreover,
123. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,
1024 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 252, 892(5),
217 cmts. f-g).
124. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (explaining normal course of business for eBay).
125. Id.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D cmt. a (defining implied
consent in emergency situations as situation where if one "had the opportunity to
decide he would certainly consent").
127. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
128. Burk, supra note 6, at 37-38.
129. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. The court further notes that "[e]ven if
[Bidder's Edge]'s web crawlers were authorized to make individual queries of
eBay's system, [Bidder's Edge]'s web crawlers exceeded the scope of any such con-
[Vol. 47: p. 117
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even if Bidder's Edge's searches were initially within the scope of eBay's
consent, that consent can be and was withdrawn: "eBay repeatedly and
explicitly notified [Bidder's Edge] that its use of eBay's computer system
was unauthorized. The entire reason [Bidder's Edge] directed its queries
through proxy servers was to evade eBay's attempts to stop this unautho-
rized access." 130
Despite these considerations, Bidder's Edge's searches still could be
deemed authorized if compelling policy considerations warranted it. In
fact, however, the policy considerations all incline to support the eBay de-
cision. As discussed above, powerful political and economic reasons sup-
port giving web businesses the same control over access that brick-and-
mortar businesses enjoy, and trespass to chattels is the logical doctrinal
framework to use to achieve this goal.1 3 1 Finding Bidder's Edge's searches
of eBay to be authorized would be inconsistent with this goal.
C. Impairment of Condition, Quality or Value of eBay's Computer Systems
One who commits trespass to chattels is liable if "the chattel is im-
paired as to its condition, quality, or value." 13 2 The eBay court found that
"eBay is likely to be able to demonstrate that [Bidder's Edge]'s activities
have diminished the quality or value of eBay's computer systems." 133 The
court explained that:
[I] t is undisputed that eBay's server and its capacity are personal
property, and that [Bidder's Edge]'s searches use a portion of
this property. Even if, as [Bidder's Edge] argues, its searches use
only a small amount of eBay's computer system capacity, [Bid-
der's Edge] has nonetheless deprived eBay of the ability to use
that portion of its personal property for its own purposes. The
law recognizes no such right to use another's personal
property. 1
3 4
The use of eBay's computer capacity is what the court determined to be
the relevant reduction in "condition, quality, or value."' 3 5 Bidder's Edge
used it without authorization, thereby reducing the computer capacity
available for authorized uses.
sent when they began acting like robots by making repeated queries." Id. (citing
City of Amsterdam v. Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd., 882 F. Supp. 1273, 1281 (E.D.N.Y.
1995)).
130. Id.
131. For a discussion of the political and economic reasons that support giv-
ing web businesses same control as brick-and-mortar businesses, see supra notes 21-
23 and accompanying text.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 cmt. c (1977).
133. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
134. Id.
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The eBay court's decision provoked a sharply critical academic reac-
tion from Bidder's Edge supporters, who argued that:
[t]he district court effectively vitiated the requirement of injury
proximately caused by a trespass. The court rejected every single
claim of actual harm that eBay alleged.... [T] he court suggested
that merely accessing a computer connected to the Internet for a
purpose not specifically authorized by the computer necessarily
injures eBay by "depriving" it of the right to use that server as it
sees fit.
13 6
The Bidder's Edge supporters accused the court of relying:
on a principle of "inviolability" of property that has never been
the rule for personal property and certainly not for information.
As the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes clear, "[t]he inter-
est of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar
interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an
action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with
the chattel. In order that an actor who interferes with another's
chattel may be liable, his conduct must affect some other and
more important interest of the possessor ... in the physical con-
dition, quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is de-
prived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time." No such
harm has been found in this case. 13 7
The position argued by the supporters of Bidder's Edge should be re-
jected. Even if Bidder's Edge's searches qualify as merely "harmless inter-
meddling," there is still a good reason to find a trespass.
The rationale for finding no trespass in the harmless intermeddling
cases is the availability and effectiveness of self-help:
one who intentionally intermeddles with another's chattel is sub-
ject to liability only if his intermeddling is harmful to the posses-
sor's materially valuable interest in the physical condition,
quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of
the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or some other legally
protected interest of the possessor is affected .... Sufficient legal
136. Brief of Amici Curiae Reed Elsevier, Inc. et al. at I1, eBay Inc. v. Bidders
Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C-99-21200). Supporters
also argue that "[i]n place of evidence of actual injury, the court relied upon its
theory of possible future harm should dozens of companies like Bidder's Edge
attempt to do the same thing it is doing." Id. This confuses the eBay court's analy-
sis for trespass to chattels with its analysis for injunctive relief. The court relied on
"possible fiture harm" to argue that eBay faces the kind of irreparable injury re-
quired for issuing an injunction. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (examining
eBay's arguments of harm). It did not rely on "possible future harm" in finding a
trespass to chattels.
137. Brief of Amici Curiae Reed Elsevier, Inc. et al. at II, eBay (No. C-99-
21200) (quoting RESTA-rEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 218 cmt. e (1977)).
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protection of the possessor's interest in the mere inviolability of his chattel
is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his possession
against even harmless interference.1 38
Is "sufficient legal protection" of eBay's interest in the "mere inviolability"
of its server afforded by its privilege to use reasonable force to protect it?
The eBay/Bidder's Edge dispute shows why the answer is no.
eBay attempted to prevent Bidder's Edge's searches by blocking ac-
cess from IP addresses used by Bidder's Edge. As the eBay court explains:
To enable computers to communicate with each other over the
Internet, each is assigned a unique Internet Protocol ("IP") ad-
dress. When a computer requests information from another
computer over the Internet, the requesting computer must offer
its IP address to the responding computer in order to allow a
response to be sent. These IP addresses allow the identification
of the source of incoming requests. eBay identifies robotic activ-
ity on its site by monitoring the number of incoming requests
from each particular IP address. Once eBay identifies an IP ad-
dress believed to be involved in robotic activity, an investigation
into the identity, origin and owner of the IP address may be
made in order to determine if the activity is legitimate or unau-
thorized. If an investigation reveals unauthorized robotic activ-
ity, eBay may attempt to ignore ("block") any further requests
from that IP address.139
The problem is that circumventing attempts to block requests from an IP
address is easy. A secondary aggregator can accomplish this by using
proxy servers, which are software programs that route outgoing and in-
coming Internet traffic through a central portal.140 Many organizations
use such programs because they conserve system resources, and organiza-
tions typically shield their proxy servers behind a firewall so that only au-
thorized users have access to them. Nevertheless, firewalls sometimes fail
to provide complete protection, and some organizations allow public use
of their proxy servers. As the eBay court noted, the result is that:
Outgoing requests from remote users can be routed through
such unprotected proxy servers and appear to originate from the
proxy server. Incoming responses are then received by the proxy
server and routed to the remote user. Information requests sent
through such proxy servers cannot easily be traced back to the
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ? 218 cmt. e (1977) (emphasis
added).
139. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (citations omitted).
140. See PageWise, What Is a Proxy Server? (noting possible uses of proxy servers
include restricting user access to particular sites and hiding one's own IP address
from hackers), at http://allsands.com/Science/whatisaproxy-akxgn.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 3, 2001).
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originating IP address and can be used to circumvent attempts to
block queries from the originating IP address. Blocking queries
from innocent third party proxy servers is both inefficient, be-
cause it creates an endless game of hide-and-seek, and potentially
counterproductive, as it runs a substantial risk of blocking re-
quests from legitimate, desirable users who use that proxy
server. 
14 1
The "endless game of hide-and-seek" is exemplified by the eBay/Bid-
der's Edge dispute: "by the end of November, 1999, eBay had blocked a
total of 169 IP addresses it believed [Bidder's Edge] was using to query
eBay's system. [Bidder's Edge] elected to continue crawling eBay's site by
using proxy servers to evade eBay's IP blocks." 142 Technological barriers
are less than attractive because they are ineffective, possibly block legiti-
mate access and waste resources on a technological arms race. 143
As demonstrated by eBay's fruitless attempts to prevent Bidder's
Edge's searches, Internet self-help in the form of technological barriers is
ineffective. Without the self-help rationale, however, the case for finding
no trespass in the "harmless intermeddling" situations is considerably
weakened. When combined with the compelling political and economic
reasons to grant web businesses the same control over access that brick-
and-mortar businesses have, a strong reason emerges to recognize tres-
passes even in cases of "harmless intermeddling."
In network-effect relationships, trespass to chattels should be adapted
to fit the economic and technological context of the Internet by recogniz-
ing that even a "harmless intermeddling" can be a trespass. This is not a
terribly great departure from traditional trespass to chattels. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts comments that:
There may, however, be situations ... in which the value to the
owner of a particular type of chattel may be impaired by dealing
with it in a manner that does not affect its physical condition.
Thus, the use of a toothbrush by someone else may lead a person
of ordinary sensibilities to regard the article as utterly incapable
of further use by him, and the wearing of an intimate article of
clothing may reasonably destroy its value in his eyes. In such a
case, the intermeddling is actionable even though the physical
condition of the chattel is not impaired.1 44
Bidder's Edge's use of the server does not "destroy" its value, but a reason-
able business person would certainly regard a competitor's use of the
server for the competitor's profit as seriously reducing its value. An
141. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 1062-63 (citations omitted).
143. See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LE-
GAL F. 217, 217 (discussing inefficiencies of "spider patrols" in cyberspace).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218, cmt. h (1977).
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adapted trespass to chattels doctrine fits well with network-effect relation-
ships and yields the desired consequences. 145 As examined next, the doc-
trine applies equally as well in no-network-effect and deep linking
relationships.
VI. TREsPAss IN No-NETWORK-EFFECT AND LINKING RELATIONSHIPS
No-network-effect and linking relationships share two basic features.
First, the secondary aggregator intentionally accesses (or, in the linking
cases, intentionally and foreseeably contributes to accessing) the primary
aggregator's server. Second, the access is a use of the server by another
business for its purposes, and, under the adapted trespass to chattels, the
access qualifies as a reduction in the condition, quality or value of the
server. Consequently, the access is a trespass if it is unauthorized. Author-
ization is an issue of implied consent. As argued above, by connecting to
the Internet and making its site accessible to the public, a website im-
pliedly consents to access by anyone on the Internet. But what types of
access fall within the scope of this implied consent and when is such con-
sent revocable?
145. For a discussion of competing interests relevant to a trespass to chattels
analysis, see supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text and infra notes 146-48 and
accompanying text. This analysis shows that the court wrongly rejected Tick-
etmaster's trespass to chattels claim. The court rejected the claim on the ground
that Ticketmaster, unlike eBay, did not potentially face multiple searches of its site
from a large number of secondary aggregators. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tick-
ets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000)
(exploring differences in operation of eBay and Ticketmaster). The Ticketmaster
court, like the Bidder's Edge supporters, confused the eBay court's grounds for
finding a trespass to chattels with its grounds for granting a preliminary injunction.
For a discussion of the Bidder's Edge supporters' confusion of these analyses, see
supra note 136. Actually, Ticketmaster's trespass to chattels claim is directly analo-
gous to eBay's. Compare Ticketmaster, 2000 WL 1887522, at *4 (declaring that ele-
ments to support trespass to chattels claims not satisfied), with eBay, 100 F. Supp.
2d at 1069-73 (finding trespass to chattels appropriate to address harm incurred by
eBay). Ticketmaster (the primary aggregator) stands in a network-effect relation-
ship to Tickets.corn (the secondary aggregator). Ticketmaster sells tickets to a
wide variety of events over its website. See Ticketmaster (promoting breadth of
events for which tickets are available for sale), at http://www.ticketmaster.com
(last visited Nov. 3, 2000). Ticketmaster "has exclusive arrangements to sell the
tickets for many of the largest entertainment and athletic events in the country."
Ticketmaster, 2000 WL 1887522, at *1. Ticketmaster enjoys a positive network ef-
fect. A large number of ticket buyers use Ticketmaster because they expect a large
number of tickets to be available there and not elsewhere. A large number of
ticket sellers offer tickets through Ticketmaster because they expect a large num-
ber of buyers to use it. Like eBay, ticketmaster.com is publicly accessible and
searchable, and Tickets.com exploits this fact. See Ticketmaster, 2000 WL 1887522,
at *2 (comparing business operations of Ticketmaster with that of Tickets.com).
Tickets.com actually sells tickets to some events, but the site also searches primary
ticket-selling sites to aggregate information about events and to locate where tick-
ets for those events may be purchased. SeeTicketmaster, About Us (advertising busi-
ness operating procedure), at http://www.tickets.com/aboutus.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2001). Tickets.com has exactly the same relationship to Ticketmaster as
Bidder's Edge has to eBay.
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The key to answering this question is the reasonable person standard,
which in the Internet context is a normative inquiry illustrated by the duty
of due care in tort law. The duty requires that one act as a reasonable
person would act. 146 A reasonable person is one who acts in accord with a
normative requirement of respect for others. 147 For example, one
breaches this duty by driving through a school zone during recess at one
hundred miles an hour, seriously risking bodily harm or death of children.
Such behavior is inconsistent with the respect for others demanded by tort
law. Although people do not always meet this demand, the duty of due
care articulates an ideal of reasonableness toward which people should
strive.
Reasonableness as a normative inquiry should also be the approach
taken in the Internet context. This Article began a normative inquiry in
the above discussion regarding how to balance a business' interest in con-
trolling access against the user's interest in low-cost communication and
unimpeded access to information.1 48 If the reasonable person accepts the
results of this inquiry, the doctrine of trespass to chattels produces the
desired consequences. Few object to making the result depend on a nor-
mative inquiry. As Lessig emphasizes, in cyberspace
[we] stand on the edge of an era that demands we make funda-
mental choices about what life in this space . . . will be like.
These choices will be made; there is no nature here to discover.
And when they are made, the values we hold sacred will either
influence our choices or be ignored. 149
Trespass to chattels offers a doctrinal framework in which to consider such
choices.
Instances of no-network-effect and linking relationships lie along
their respective benefit-harm continua. At the harm end of each contin-
uum, the primary aggregator should be granted the right to exclude the
secondary aggregator. To secure this result under an adapted trespass to
chattels doctrine, the secondary aggregator's access of the primary's web-
site must be regarded as unauthorized. The reasonable person standard
provides a compelling reason to find that the primary does not impliedly
consent to such access merely by connecting its website to the Internet
and making it accessible to the public. By similar reasoning, the primary's
consent to access should be revocable if the primary initially did consent
to the secondary's access-unless binding contractual agreements exist
that prevent revocation without repercussions.
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 app. (1995) (explaining rea-
sonable person standard).
147. See id. (elaborating on meaning of "reasonable person").
148. For a discussion of how to balance the web business' interest against the
Internet user's interest, see supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
149. LESSIG, CODE AND OHrER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 3, at 220.
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At the benefit end of each continuum, the primary aggregator should
not be granted the right to exclude the secondary aggregator. Regarding
the secondary aggregator's access as authorized secures this result. Apply-
ing the reasonable person standard once again, the goal of preserving ef-
fective navigation of the web is a strong reason to find that by connecting
its website to the Internet and making it accessible to the public, the pri-
mary impliedly consents to access by the secondary. As suggested above
for the harm end of each continuum, if the reasonable person accepts this
trade-off, the doctrine of trespass to chattels yields the desired result.
The same approach handles the cases that lie in the middle of the two
continua. The reasonable person standard for consent balances the com-
peting business and user interests on a case-by-case basis. Where eco-
nomic and technological conditions are novel and rapidly changing, to
avoid trying to generate hypothetical rulings in response to imagined facts
is a much safer course. As United States Supreme CourtJustice John Paul
Stevens remarked, "[w]hen we follow our traditional practice of adjudicat-
ing difficult and novel constitutional questions only in concrete factual
situations, the adjudications tend to be crafted with greater wisdom. Hy-
pothetical rulings are inherently treacherous and prone to lead us into
unforeseen errors .... -150 By applying trespass to chattels with a reasona-
ble person standard for consent, an appropriate doctrinal context in
which to avoid "hypothetical rulings" is provided.
VII. CONCLUSION
The adaptation of trespass to chattels to the Internet has significance
beyond trespass issues. The application of trespass to chattels on the In-
ternet revolves around the question of implied consent. The resolution of
this question is relevant to the broader question of where and how to draw
borders in cyberspace. Borders can be drawn along the lines of consent
where those lines track the relevant e-commerce geography.
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